Intelligence law and oversight in the UK. by Leigh,  Ian
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
26 April 2019
Version of attached file:
proof
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Leigh, Ian (2019) 'Intelligence law and oversight in the UK.', in Intelligence law and policies in Europe. , pp.
535-585.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://www.bloomsburyprofessional.com/uk/intelligence-law-and-policies-in-europe-9781509926176/
Publisher's copyright statement:
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Reemers Publishing Services GmbH
O:/Beck/Dietrich_Sule/3d/Part 5.3d from 25.03.2019 16:33:27
3B2 9.1.580; Page size: 160.00mm  240.00mm
Chapter 3
Intelligence Law and Oversight in the UK
Outline
A. Introduction ................................................................................................ ...................... 1
B. A historical sketch................................................................................................ ............ 4
I. Origins of the security and intelligence agencies............................................. 4
II. Recent controversies............................................................................................... 8
C. The legal basis for and role of the intelligence agencies ......................................... 15
D. The powers of the agencies............................................................................................ 24
I. Introductory ................................................................................................ ............. 24
II. The reform of surveillance powers ..................................................................... 28
III. Targeted interception and examination............................................................. 35
IV. Untargeted “bulk” powers..................................................................................... 41
V. Bulk personal datasets............................................................................................ 45
VI. Equipment interference ......................................................................................... 49
VII. The judicial approval process............................................................................... 51
E. Accountability of the agencies ...................................................................................... 54
I. Ministerial responsibility and control ................................................................ 54
II. Parliamentary oversight......................................................................................... 58
III. Judicial oversight ................................................................................................ ..... 65
1. The Commissioners ........................................................................................... 65
2. Investigatory Powers Tribunal ........................................................................ 68
F. Intelligence and the courts............................................................................................. 71
I. The courts and deference to national security ................................................. 71
II. Evidential protections and intelligence .............................................................. 76
1. Public interest immunity .................................................................................. 76
2. Special advocates ................................................................................................ 78
3. Closed material procedures.............................................................................. 81
4. Criminal trials and intelligence material....................................................... 84
G. Conclusion ................................................................................................ ......................... 87
Bibliography: Aldrich, R., “Whitehall and the Iraq War: the UK’s Four Intelligence Enquiries” Irish
Studies in International Affairs, 16 (2005), 73–88; R. Aldich, GCHQ: the uncensored story of Britain’s
most secret intelligence agency (Harper Collins, 2011); R. Aldrich and R. Cormac, The Black Door: Spies,
Secret Intelligence and British Prime Ministers (Harper Collins, 2016); Anderson D., Report of the Bulk
Powers Review, Cm. 9326 (2016); Andrew, C., Secret Service: the Making of the British Intelligence
Community London, 1986; Andrew, C., Defence of the Realm: the Authorized History of MI5 (London,
2009); Birkinshaw, P., Reforming the Secret State (Milton Keynes, 1990); Bochel, H., Defty, A., Kirkpa-
trick, J., “New mechanisms of independent accountability: select committees and Parliamentary scrutiny of
the intelligence services” Parliamentary Affairs, 68 (2) 314–331 (2015); Born, H., L, Johnson and I. Leigh,
Who’s Watching the Spies: Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability Dulles, Virginia, 2005; Born, H.
and I. Leigh, “Democratic Accountability of Intelligence Services”, Armaments, Disarmament and
International Security, Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2007, (Oxford
University Press 2007), ch. 5; Born, H., Leigh, I. and Willss A., International Intelligence Cooperation and
Accountability London Routledge, 2011; Born, H., Leigh, I. and Willss A., Making International
Intelligence Cooperation Accountable Oslo, Norwegian Parliament Printing House, 2015; Chamberlain,
M., “Update on procedural fairness in closed proceedings”. (2009) 28(4) Civil Justice Quarterly 448–543;
Davies, P., MI6 and the Machinery of Spying (Frank Cass, 2004); Defty, A., “Educating parliamentarians
about intelligence: The role of the British Intelligence and Security Committee” Parliamentary Affairs
2008 61(4):621–641; Fikfak, V. and H. Hooper, Parliament’s Secret War (Hart, Oxford 2018); Forcese, C.
and L., Waldman, Seeking Justice in an Unfair Process: Lessons from Canada, the United Kingdom, and
New Zealand on the Use of “Special Advocates” in National Security Proceedings Ottawa, 2007; Gill P.,
Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State, (Frank Cass, London, 1994);
Forsyth, C., “Public Interest Immunity: Recent and Future Developments” (1997) 56 Cambridge Law
Journal 51; Gill, P.,”The Politicization of Intelligence: Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq”, in H. Born, L.
Ian Leigh 553
Reemers Publishing Services GmbH
O:/Beck/Dietrich_Sule/3d/Part 5.3d from 25.03.2019 16:33:27
3B2 9.1.580; Page size: 160.00mm  240.00mm
Johnson and I. Leigh (eds.), Who’s Watching the Spies: Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability
Dulles, Potomac Books, 2005; Gill, P., “Evaluating Intelligence Oversight Committees: the case of the UK
Intelligence Security Committee and the “War on Terror”” Intelligence and National Security, 22(1)
pp. 14–37 (2007); Gill, P., “The ISC and the Challenge of International Security Networks”, Review of
International Studies 35 (2009) p. 932; Glees, A., P. Davies, P. and J. Morrison, The Open Side of Secrecy:
Britain’s Intelligence and Security Committee, London., Social Affairs Unit, 2006; Glover, R., Murphy on
Evidence (14th ed., Oxford 2015), ch. 13; Horne, A. and Walker, C., “Parliament and National Security” in
Horne, A. and Le Sueur, A. (eds.), Parliament: Legislation and Accountability (Hart, Oxford, 2016);
Intelligence and Security Committee, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction- Intelligence and Assessments,
Cm.5972, 2003; Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Privacy and Security: A modern and
Transparent Legal Framework (March 2015) HC 1075; Jackson, J.,”The Role of Special Advocates:
Advocacy, Due Process and the Adversarial Tradition”, (2016) 20(4) International Journal of Evidence
and Proof 343–362; Jacob, J.,”From Privileged Crown to Interested Public” [1993] Public Law 121; Jeffery,
K., MI6: the History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1949 (Bloomsbury, 2010); Justice, Secret
Evidence London, 2009; Leigh, I., “Public Interest Immunity”, (1997) Parliamentary Affairs 55–70; Leigh,
I., and L. L. Lustgarten, “Five Volumes in Search of Accountability: The Scott Report”, (1996) 59 Modern
Law Review 695–725; Leigh, I., Reforming Public Interest Immunity [1995] 2 Web Journal of Current
Legal Issues http://www.bailii.org/uk/other/journals/WebJCLI/1995/issue2/leigh2.html; Leigh, I.,”Parlia-
mentary Oversight of Intelligence in the UK: A Critical Evaluation” in H. Born and M. Caparini (eds.),
Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007; Leigh,
I.,”The Role of Judges” in S. Farson and M.Pythian (eds.), Commissions of Inquiry and National Security:
Comparative Approaches (Praeger, 2010), ch. 16; Leigh, I.,”National Courts and International Intelligence
Cooperation” in H. Born, I. Leigh and A. Wills (eds.), International Intelligence Cooperation and
Accountability, (Routledge, 2011); Leigh, I., “Rebalancing Rights and National Security: Reforming UK
Intelligence Oversight a Decade After 9/11” (2012) 27 (5) Intelligence and National Security 721–737;
Lustgarten, L. and I. Leigh In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy, Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1994; McKay, S., Blackstone’s Guide to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017); McKay, S. and Walker, C., “Legal regulation of intelligence
services in the United Kingdom” in Dietrich, J-H. and Eiffler, S.R. (eds.), Handbuch des Rechts der
Nachrichtendienste (Richard Boorberg, Stuttgart, 2017); Moran, J. and Walker, C., “Intelligence Powers
and Accountability in the U.K.” in Goldman, Z.K. and Rascoff, S.J. (eds.), Global Intelligence Oversight:
Governing Security in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford University Press, New York, 2016) pp. 289–314;
Murray C., “Out of the Shadows: the Courts and the United Kingdom’s Malfunctioning Counter-
Terrorism Partnerships”, Journal of Conflict & Security Law 2013, 18(2), 193–232; Peto, A. and Tyrie,
A., Neither Just Nor Secure London Centre for Policy Studies, 2011; Phythian M., “The British Experience
with Intelligence Accountability” Intelligence and National Security, 22 (1), p. 81 (2007); Pythian,
M.,”Intelligence Oversight in the UK: The case of Iraq”, in L. Johnson (ed.), Handbook of Intelligence
Studies, (Routledge 2007); Phythian M.,”A Very British Institution”: The Intelligence and Security
Committee and Intelligence Accountability in the United Kingdom’, in Loch K. Johnson (ed.), Oxford
Handbook of National Security Intelligence (New York, Oxford University Press, 2010), 699–718;
Phythian, M., “The British Experience with Intelligence Accountability: The First Twenty Years”, in
Loch K. Johnson (ed.) Essentials of Strategic Intelligence (Santa Barbara, CA, Praeger Security Interna-
tional, 2015), 447–69; Sullivan, J., “Closed Material Procedures and the Right to a Fair Trial” , 29
Maryland J. Int’l Law 269 (2014); Supperstone, M., “A New Approach to Public Interest Immunity?”
[1997] Public Law 211; Tomkins, A.,”Public Interest Immunity After Matrix Churchill” [1993] Public Law
650; Tomkins, A.,“National Security and the Due Process of Law” 64(1) Current Legal Problems 215–253
(2011); Wadham, J., “The Intelligence Services Act 1994” Modern Law Review, 57: 916–927 (1994).
A. Introduction
1 This Chapter addresses the legal framework within which security and intelligence
agencies operate in the United Kingdom. A brief historical sketch traces the agencies
from their foundation in the early twentieth century, focusing particularly on contro-
versies since the end of the Cold War. This is followed by discussion of the legal basis
and the role of the intelligence agencies, as well as the non-statutory elements of the
intelligence community. The succeeding section deals with the powers of the agencies.
This area which has undergone extensive discussion following the disclosures since 2013
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of Edward Snowden and comprehensive revision, especially of bulk collection powers,
in new legislation- the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.
2Discussion of the accountability and oversight arrangements for the agencies falls
under three headings: ministerial responsibility and control; parliamentary oversight
through the Intelligence and Security Committee; and judicial oversight by the Com-
missioners (and the newly-created office of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner)
and by the body responsible for handling complaints concerning the agencies (the
Investigatory Powers Tribunal).
3The section examining intelligence and the courts opens by discussing how far the
historically deferential attitude of the judiciary towards claims of national security has
been modified post 9/11. It then moves on to assess evidential and procedural restric-
tions designed to allow and protect intelligence in civil proceedings: Public Interest
Immunity, followed by the growth in use of security-cleared Special Advocates and the
introduction of Closed Material Procedures.
The Conclusion points to some emerging and future trends, notably the increasing
importance of cyberwarfare and the future of intelligence cooperation after Brexit.
B. A historical sketch
I. Origins of the security and intelligence agencies
4The United Kingdom does not have a written constitution. Historically, matters of
defence and national security were dealt with under powers derived from the preroga-
tive (the residue of non-statutory power enjoyed by Crown and recognised at common
law). This includes decisions over war and peace, the deployment of armed forces and
the creation and organisation of security forces. In modern times these prerogative
powers are exercised by ministers on behalf of the Crown rather than by the sovereign
personally. Elements of control outside the executive branch have been introduced as a
number of aspects of the defence and security prerogatives have been replaced or
limited by legislation. In addition, the reach of judicial review by the courts into this
field has extended in recent years and increasingly Parliament also has sought to call the
government to account for the exercise of security and defence powers.
5The three main security and intelligence agencies were created secretly in the early
twentieth century, without reference to Parliament, under prerogative powers. The
Secret Service Bureau, the forerunner of both MI5 and MI6 dated from 1909.1 The
predecessor of GCHQ, the Government Code and Cipher School, was established in
1919.2 Official acknowledgement of their existence and the granting of statutory
charters came much later: to the Security Service (MI5) in 1989 and to the Secret
Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6) and the Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ) in 1994. The relevant statutes are the Security Service Act 1989 and the
Intelligence Services Act 1994 (the latter covering SIS and GCHQ).
6Prior to the 1989 legislation the Security Service’s work was governed by the
Maxwell-Fyfe Directive – a brief administrative Charter named after the Home Secre-
tary who issued it in 1952 – which emphasized the Service’s role in the “Defence of the
1 C. Andrew, Secret Service: the Making of the British Intelligence Community (London 1986) 121 ff.; C.
Andrew, Defence of the Realm: the Authorized History of MI5 (London, 2009) S. A, Chs. 1–3.
2 https://www.gchq.gov.uk/topics/our-history (accessed 6 June 2018).
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Realm”, together with its duty to behave non-politically.3 The Service was, nevertheless,
responsible to the Home Secretary and its Director-General had a right of access to the
Prime Minister. The Security Service Act 1989 reaffirmed the existing constitutional
position under the Directive and gave an explicit statutory basis for the Service’s work.
The impetus for doing so came from concerns that the Service’s use of surveillance and
personal information violated the right to private life, home and correspondence under
the European Convention on Human Rights.
7 GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters)4 – the signals intelligence
agency – came to public attention in the mid-1980s, largely because of a protracted
industrial dispute about the ban on officers there belonging to a trade union5 and
disclosures about war-time code-breaking, but it lacked a statutory remit until 1994. The
Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) was not even officially acknowledged to exist until 1992.6
The Intelligence Services Act 1994 provided a statutory charter for both agencies and it
also filled notable gap in the 1989 Act by creating for all the three agencies a statutory
committee of parliamentarians, drawn from both Houses of Parliament -the Intelligence
and Security Committee (“ISC”). The Justice and Security Act 2013 formally reconstituted
the ISC as a committee of Parliament, although there remain some differences between it
and a conventional parliamentary select committee. It is the current legislation governing
its remit and powers.
II. Recent controversies
8 The agencies have been drawn into controversy on several occasions following 9/11,
partly as alleged failures relating to the intelligence leading up to Iraq war and prior to
major terrorist attacks in Britain. Allegations about complicity in torture or rendition
have been extensively litigated and are under continuing investigation by the Intelligence
and Security Committee. Finally, the disclosures of Edward Snowden have resulted in a
flurry of legal challenges by NGOs to various surveillance practices, several major reviews
of surveillance and to a comprehensive new statutory regime (the Investigatory Powers
Act 2016).
9 The events prior to the Iraq War raised serious public concerns that the possible
politicisation of intelligence. The government chose, in the attempt to enlist public and
political support for its policy, to release, in September 2002 and February 2003, two
dossiers of intelligence-related material concerning the attempts of the Iraqi regime to
acquire and develop “Weapons of Mass Destruction”.7 Allegations that intelligence was
fabricated or knowingly mis-stated for political ends were subsequently refuted follow-
ing official reports by the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) and by Lord
Hutton, a senior judge. They did, however, find other unsatisfactory features concerning
3 Lord Denning’s Report, Cmnd. 2152 (1963); https://www.mi5.gov.uk/who-we-are (accessed 6 June
2018).
4 https://www.gchq.gov.uk/topics/our-history (accessed 6 June 2018). On the history of GCHQ see R.
Aldich, GCHQ: the uncensored story of Britain’s most secret intelligence agency (Harper Collins, 2011).
5 The decision was unsuccessfully challenged in the courts: Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister
for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374.
6 http://www.mi6.gov.uk/output/sis-home-welcome.html. An official history of the early decades of SIS
was published in 2010: K. Jeffery, MI6: the History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1949
(Bloomsbury, 2010). See also P. Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying (Frank Cass, 2004).
7 P. Gill, “The Politicization of Intelligence: Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq”, in H. Born, L. Johnson
and I. Leigh (eds.), Who’s Watching the Spies: Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability (Dulles,
Virginia, 2005). M. Pythian, “Intelligence Oversight in the UK: The case of Iraq”, in L. Johnson (ed.),
Handbook of Intelligence Studies, (Routledge 2007).
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the process. The ISC criticised the prominence given to one claim (that Saddam Hussein
possessed weapons of mass destruction that could be brought into use in 45 minutes)
and the partial and misleading treatment given to it.8 The subsequent Hutton report
found that the Joint Intelligence Committee Chairman and staff may have been
“subconsciously” influenced to make statements that were more definitive than was
usual in intelligence assessments in compiling the dossiers with a view to publication.9 A
later Privy Counsellors’ review chaired, by Lord Butler (a former Cabinet Secretary),10
confirmed this conclusion and went further in proposing safeguards over future public
uses of intelligence and in suggesting changes in MI6, Defence Intelligence and JIC
practice. These resulted in two reforms to the central intelligence machine. The first was
the combining of the roles of Secretary to the Joint Intelligence Committee and
Intelligence Coordinator into a Permanent Secretary of Intelligence, Security and
Resilience whose responsibilities now also include giving strategic guidance to the
intelligence community and accounting for the resources devoted to the agencies under
the Single Intelligence Account. The second was the creation within the Cabinet Office
of the post of Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis.11
10Allegations of complicity by UK agencies in the torture of terrorist suspects held
abroad led to investigations by the Intelligence and Security Committee (the “ISC”) in
2007 into extraordinary renditions12 and by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on
Human Rights in 2009.13 In a legal challenge brought by one Guantanamo Bay detainee,
Binyam Mohammed, the Court of Appeal found in 2010 that the Security Service had
misled the ISC that they “operated a culture that respected human rights and that
coercive interrogation techniques were alien to the services’ general ethics methodology
and training”. In contrast, Lord Neuberger concluded, that “at least some Security
Services officials appear to have a dubious record when it comes to actual involvement
and frankness about such involvement with the mistreatment of Mr Mohamed”.14
Following the judgment the government settled the claim and those brought by a
number of other litigants, who claimed that the agencies had been complicit in torture,
by paying substantial compensation. Detailed instructions to cover the questioning by
the agencies of terrorist suspects held abroad were published15 and a judicial inquiry
was established. The inquiry was subsequently disbanded, however, in the light of fresh
criminal investigations into the involvement of MI6 in the rendition to Libya of a
dissident, Abdel Hakim Belhaj, and his wife, Fatima Boudchar, which came to light after
the fall of the Gaddafi regime, as it was unable to complete its work while the criminal
investigations were in progress. In December 2013 the ISC agreed to take over the
8 Intelligence and Security Committee, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction- Intelligence and Assess-
ments, Cm. 5972, 2003, para 86.
9 Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr David Kelly C.M.G., H.C.
247 (2003–4), para 467, http://www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk.
10 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors
(2003–4) HC 898.
11 National Intelligence Machinery 2010.
12 Intelligence and Security Committee, Rendition (2007), Cm 7171, paras 111–47. See also: Intelligence
and Security Committee, The Handling of Detainees by UK Intelligence Personnel in Afghanistan,
Guantanamo Bay and Iraq (2005) Cm 6469.
13 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Allegations of UK Complicity in Torture, para 60.
14 R (on the application of Binyam Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs [2010] EWCA Civ 158, para 29.
15 Consolidated Guidance to Intelligence Officers and Service Personnel on Detention and Interviewing
of Detainees Overseas, and on the Passing and Receipt of Intelligence Relating to Detainees https://www.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62632/Consolidated_Guidance_No-
vember_2011.pdf (accessed 21 February 2018).
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investigation from the judicial inquiry and this work is ongoing. In May 2018 the Prime
Minister made a formal apology to Belhaj and Boudchar for the UK Government’s
actions.16
11 The Snowden revelations have had a significant impact in the UK since a number of
them concern the work of GCHQ and its collaboration with the NSA in bulk collection
of communication data. Snowden’s allegations made the public aware about the
agencies collection activities on a previously unimagined scale. Those alleged activities
include, among other things, the services’ direct access to fibre optic cables that carry
much communications traffic (TEMPORA),17 access to the servers of leading internet
companies under joint programmes (PRISM),18 and extensive computer network
exploitation to implant malware (in particular to access Belgacom and Gemalto, a
major producer of mobile phone SIM cards).19
12 The UK Government’s initial reaction was to issue categorical- if carefully worded-
denials of Snowden’s allegations that SIGINT cooperation is used to circumvent
legislation. In Parliament Ministers’ initial response to Snowden’s allegations was a
mixture of generalised reassurance and to point to the more detailed, but largely
irrelevant, scheme governing interception warrants. Since the allegations centred on
“mass surveillance” by GCHQ involving interception of external communications and
collection of metadata this amounted to evasion rather than a meaningful response. The
ISC supported these ministerial assurances by its own statement on the PRISM
programme20 that it had found no evidence that the law was being broken. Far from
being an endorsement of the existing position, if anything these statements implied that
the legislation was deficient, as the committee itself later acknowledged in its 2015
report Privacy and Security.21
13 There followed a spate of other official reviews and test cases brought by privacy
campaigners (described in S. D. II below). The outcome is that a number of obscure or
secret information-gathering techniques employed by the agencies, particularly in
relation to bulk data and equipment interference, have been officially acknowledged
and brought within a detailed statutory framework.
14 The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 makes significant changes to the legal regime
governing surveillance (see S. D. III-VI below).22 Some of these changes (especially
16 “Belhaj Rendition: UK apology over Libyan dissident treatment”, BBC News 10 May 2018. http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-44070304 (accessed 5 June 2018).
17 TEMPORA was said to involve the interception by GCHQ of digital traffic flowing through the
underwater fibre optic cables landing in the UK.
18 “The PRISM programme was said to involve the collection by the NSA of data from the servers of
nine US internet companies (Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube and
Apple –’the Prism Providers’). Types of data collected included a range of digital information such as
email, chat, videos, photos, stored data, VOIP, video conferencing and online social networking details.”
(Anderson, A Question of Trust, Annex 7).
19 David Anderson QC (Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation), A Question of Trust,
Annex 7.7.
20 Statement by the ISC regarding GCHQ’s alleged access to the US PRISM programme, July 2103
https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20130717_ISC_sta-
tement_GCHQ.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7coZE-rHTq9Qzt2ZUBDHYRhsr1oop0VRWbG3M7vS0R8jGCov-
CwsUInaAlJ4T05hWcB8ApdN3mbge3Ey66211zyzdHjeyIj1x_pScLmjavzvy-4Dsxp4MojNPfJGRvSlAbi–
oOL2cFrLrIz6SqlaQ5n4yc1sAJzUNhv54EHYePW7mN5742OVbKTsdSXfzc7g_Id8cv_a-fVJhyzy2xCAu-
QiXORftFftP-kzkMNH8sujSgGNIsTQ%3D&attredirects=0.
21 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Privacy and Security: A modern and Transparent
Legal Framework (March 2015) HC 1075.
22 The legislation is highly technical and complex and only a brief summary of the relevant key features
can be given here. See further: S. McKay, Blackstone’s Guide to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017).
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those on data retention, precipitated by the Digital Rights judgment)23 had been under
discussion for several years and had already generated significant opposition from civil
libertarians, prior to the Snowden revelations. Nonetheless, it is clear that those
disclosures had a significant impact, in particular by forcing additional admissions
about bulk collection or strategic communication intelligence by UK agencies, by
fuelling a debate about the legality and the adequacy of oversight of these practices
within the current regime, and by shaping proposals in the draft legislation.24
C. The legal basis for and role of the intelligence agencies
15The relevant provisions are the Security Service Act 198925 and the Intelligence
Services Act 1994 (the latter covering SIS and GCHQ). Other parts of the intelligence
machinery – especially those concerned with intelligence analysis- such as the Defence
Intelligence and the Joint Intelligence Committee are creatures of the prerogative and
remain outside the statutory framework. A separation is made between security and
policing: the agencies do not have the power to arrest or to prosecute- even in the fields
of counter-terrorism and counter-espionage, these are the province of the police and the
Crown Prosecution Service, with whom the services work closely.
16Before the 1989 Act the Security Service’s work was governed by the Maxwell-Fyfe
Directive – a brief administrative Charter named after the Home Secretary who issued it
in 1952 – which emphasized the Service’s role in the “Defence of the Realm”, together
with its duty to behave non-politically.26 The Service was, nevertheless, responsible to
the Home Secretary and its Director-General had a right of access to the Prime
Minister. The Security Service Act 1989 reaffirmed the existing constitutional position
under the Directive (the Service was accountable only to ministers and not to Parlia-
ment) but cast it in statutory form. However, the Act did provide an explicit statutory
basis for the Service’s work. The impetus for doing so came from concerns that the
Service’s use of surveillance and personal information violated the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (see further below).
17GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters)27 – the signals intelligence
agency – came to public attention in the mid-1980s, largely because of a protracted
industrial dispute about the ban on officers there belonging to a trade union28 and
disclosures about war-time code-breaking, but it lacked a statutory remit until 1994.
23 Emergency legislation was introduced (the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014)
following the judgment of the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Communications (Joined
Cases C 293/12 and C 594/12) to provide a stop-gap legal basis for requirements on telephone and
internet companies to retain “communications data” on individuals for up to a year. This legislation
contained a sunset clause of 31 December 2016 and is superseded by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016,
Pt. 3.
24 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Privacy and Security: A modern and Transparent
Legal Framework (March 2015) HC 1075 (hereafter “Privacy and Security”); David Anderson QC
(Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation), A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers
Review (2015) (hereafter “A Question of Trust”) ; Royal United Services Institute, A Democratic Licence to
Operate: Report of the Independent Surveillance Review (London, 2015) (hereafter “A Democratic Licence
to Operate”) .
25 I. Leigh and L. L. Lustgarten, “The Security Service Act 1989” (1989) 52 Modern Law Review
801–836; P. Birkinshaw, Reforming the Secret State (Milton Keynes, 1990).
26 See also http://www.mi5.gov.uk//history.html.
27 https://www.gchq.gov.uk/(accessed 6 June 2018).
28 The decision was unsuccessfully challenged in the courts: Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister
for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374.
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The Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) was not even officially acknowledged to exist until
1992.29 The Intelligence Services Act 1994 provided a statutory charter for both agencies
and it also filled notable gap in the 1989 Act by creating for all three agencies a statutory
committee of parliamentarians, drawn from both Houses of Parliament -the Intelligence
and Security Committee.30
18 Although MI5 is a security agency, MI6 is responsible for intelligence31 and GCHQ
for signals intelligence and information security,32 all three agencies have the common
statutory functions of the protection of national security, protecting the economic well-
being of the UK33 and assisting (the police or customs) in preventing or detecting
serious crime. The statutory approach to national security differs markedly, however,
between the Security Service and the other agencies. This is undoubtedly because of civil
liberties sensitivities about the impact of domestic security operations, although strictly
the legislation does not prohibit domestic operations against appropriate targets by SIS
and GCHQ (nor prohibit MI5 from working overseas).
19 Consequently the Security Service’s statutory aims are more closely defined than with
the other agencies: in its case the protection of national security, including (but not
limited to) protection against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the
activities of agents of foreign powers, and “actions intended to overthrow or undermine
parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means” (“counter-subver-
sion”).34 The breadth of these aims reflects the Cold War origins of the Maxwell-Fyfe
Directive. In practice, however, counter-terrorism now accounts for more than 80 % of
MI5’s effort and resources. Since the end of the Cold War the controversial area of
counter-subversion, which many believed betrayed a bias against radical political and
pressure groups, has been dormant.35 In view of the politically sensitive nature of its role
in the domestic arena, there are two important safeguards that limit the Service’s
work.36 Collection of information must be restricted to what is “necessary for the
proper discharge of its functions” (and likewise its disclosure). The Director-General is
also responsible for ensuring that the Service does not take any action to further the
interests of any political party.
20 The Intelligence Services Act takes a much broader approach to SIS and GCHQ-
referring to “the interests of national security, with particular reference to the Defence
and foreign policies of Her Majesty’s Government”.37 The emphasis on the policies of
the government of the day, rather than on overriding national interests is an oblique
acknowledgement that the priorities of these agencies are set through “tasking”
approved at ministerial level in the annual submission “United Kingdom’s National
Requirements for Secret Intelligence”.
21 Within these broad parameters the functions of MI6 are “to obtain and provide
information relating to the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands.
29 http://www.mi6.gov.uk/output/sis-home-welcome.html.
30 L. Lustgarten and I. Leigh, In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy
(Oxford 1994), Coda; J.Wadham, “The Intelligence Services Act 1994” (1994) 57 Modern Law Review,
916–927.
31 http://www.mi6.gov.uk/output/sis-home-welcome.html.
32 http://www.gchq.gov.uk/.
33 Limited, however, to the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands.
34 Security Service Act 1989, S. 1.
35 Lustgarten and Leigh, In From the Cold, Ch. 14.
36 Security Service Act 1989, S. 2(2).
37 Intelligence Services Act 1994 Ss. 1(2)(a) and 3(2)(a). GCHQ’s functions can also be exercised under
Ss. 3(2) “in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom in relation to the actions or
intentions of persons outside the British Islands;” and “in support of the prevention or detection of
serious crime”.
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[and] …to perform other tasks relating to the actions or intentions of such persons”.38
The coy reference to other “other tasks” is of course polite usage for a range of actions
from espionage to covert action, many of which will be illegal according to the laws of
the country where they are undertaken.
22GCHQ has two roles: signals intelligence and information assurance. In relation to
the first its brief to conduct all types of signals interception (and disruption) and de-
cryption.39 The second (and more defensive) role is that of providing technical advice
on communications and information technology security to government departments
and the armed forces.40 A significant omission is the failure of the 1994 legislation to
detail the arrangements for international cooperation (especially with the United
States’ National Security Agency, the NSA) which is known to affect much of GCHQ’s
work.
23Four parts of the intelligence structure are outside the statutory framework – the
Defence Intelligence, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), the Intelligence Assess-
ments Staff and the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC).41 The role of the first two
especially came under close scrutiny as a result of events surrounding the use of
intelligence in the public justification of the UK’s involvement in the war in Iraq. The
Defence Intelligence42 is part of the Ministry of Defence and supports the Armed Forces
by analyzing information, from open and covert sources, and providing assessments
both for them and for the Joint Intelligence Committee. It provides assessments and
advice to guide policy decisions, inform defence research and equipment programmes;
and support military operations. The head, the Chief of Defence Intelligence (who
reports to the Minister of Defence) is also responsible for coordination of intelligence
throughout the Armed Forces. The Joint Intelligence Committee sits at the hub of the
intelligence machine, in the Cabinet Office, formally connecting it with government. It
is responsible for tasking the agencies (especially SIS and GCHQ) and for providing
intelligence assessments based on the agencies’ output which are circulated within
government, including the relevant ministers. The JIC membership includes not only
the heads of the security and intelligence agencies, but also senior officials from the
Cabinet Office, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Home Office, the
Department of Trade and Industry and the Treasury. The Joint Terrorism Analysis
Centre (JTAC) was created in 2003 as the UK’s centre for the analysis and assessment of
international terrorism. It is housed within the Security Service (since this the lead
agency for counter-terrorism in the UK) and is responsible to the Director-General of
the Service.43 Its role is to analyse and assess all intelligence relating to international
terrorism, whether domestic or abroad, and to produce threat assessments to other
government departments and agencies. JTAC’s effectiveness is monitored by an Over-
sight Board, chaired by the Cabinet Office.
38 Intelligence Services Act 1994, S. 1(1).
39 “to monitor or interfere with electromagnetic, acoustic and other emissions and any equipment
producing such emissions and to obtain and provide information derived from or related to such
emissions or equipment and from encrypted material”: Intelligence Services Act 1994, S. 3 (1) (a).
40 S. 3 (1) (b).
41 National Intelligence Machinery 2010.
42 Formerly the Defence Intelligence Staff. For a current description of Defence Intelligence see: https://
www.gov.uk/government/groups/defence-intelligence (accessed 6 June 2018).
43 Ibid., 15.
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D. The powers of the agencies
I. Introductory
24 The agencies powers are limited to information gathering through various means
related to their function.44 They do not have powers of arrest or detention and formal
powers to question or interview individuals. The Security Service in particular, however,
works closely with the police in counter-terrorism and official secrets investigations and
prosecutions.45
25 The origins of the power to intercept communications in the UK are obscure: up to
the 1980s the government relied on the prerogative as legal authority for warrants
issued by ministers for mail opening and phone tapping, until the practice was
successfully challenged before the European Court of Human Rights in the Malone
case.46 Following that decision a statutory scheme for interceptions was enacted-
initially in the Interception of Communications Act 1985 and then in the Regulation
of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.47 This permits warrants (still issued by a minister,
rather than a judge) for the prevention or detection of serious crime, in the interest of
national security or for safeguarding the country’s economic well-being. The system is
overseen by a Judicial Commissioner who reports annually. The Investigatory Powers
Act 2016 (not yet in force) introduces important changes to this system of “targeted
surveillance” by the agencies, described below.
26 The need to demonstrate a clear legal basis for other forms of state surveillance in
order to comply with Article 8 also led in 2000 to the introduction of an umbrella
regime for covert surveillance by the services and the police – the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000. The 2000 Act currently governs intelligence gathering
by the agencies involving the use of covert surveillance, covert human intelligence
sources (agents) and various forms of technical surveillance: the interception of com-
munications, and the acquisition, disclosure and retention of communications data. The
legislation requires that intelligence gathering using any of these must be authorised by
designated persons within the agencies who review that it is necessary and propor-
tionate to the aims of the investigation, and that the information cannot be obtained
using less intrusive methods.48 These authorisations must be recorded, and made
available for review by the Judicial Commissioners, who ensure intelligence gathering
is proportionate and not used excessively or inappropriately. Interception of commu-
nications and “intrusive surveillance” (i. e. conducted on private premises or a private
vehicle) additionally require a warrant signed by a Secretary of State. Many instances of
44 General provisions apply. S. 2(2) of the Security Service Act 1989 requires the Director-General to
ensure that there are arrangements limiting the collection of information by that Service to that necessary
for the proper discharge of the Service’s role or for preventing or detecting serious crime. There are
equivalent provisions for MI6 and GCHQ: Intelligence Services Act 1994, Ss. 2(2)(a) and 4(2)(a).
45 On police powers of surveillance see M. Amos “The Impact of Human Rights Law on Measures of
Mass Surveillance in the United Kingdom”, in F. Davis, N. McGarrity and G. Williams, Surveillance,
Counter-Terrorism and Comparative Constitutionalism (Routledge, 2014).
46 Malone v. UK (1984) 7 EHRR 14.
47 For an overview see: J. Moran and C. Walker, “Intelligence Powers and Accountability in the UK”, in
Z. Goldman and S. Racoff (eds.), Global Intelligence Oversight: Governing Security in the Twenty-First
Century (Oxford University Press, 2016).
48 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, S. 28 (in the case of “directed surveillance” ie covert
surveillance in a public place) and S. 29 (in the case of covert human intelligence sources) and Sch. 1.
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intrusive surveillance will in any event involve interference with property (for example,
to plant and recover covert audio and video devices) and so will fall within the regime
for property warrants (issued by the Secretary of State) under the Intelligence Services
Act 1994.
27The provisions concerning interception of communications and communications
data will be replaced by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, once it is in force and the
account below focuses on those new provisions. A brief explanation is necessary,
however, of the context for the changes.
II. The reform of surveillance powers
28Prior to the 2016 Act the RIPA provisions drew a distinction between interception
warrants, which identified specific targets for surveillance and were approved individu-
ally, and “certificated warrants” for interception of external communications (i. e. where
the originator or recipient of the communication was outside the country). The latter,
approved by the Foreign Secretary, needed only to specify general categories of
information and were then subject to less rigorous controls over the examination of
material obtained. Interception of metadata was likewise subject to lighter regulation
and could be undertaken by a number of public agencies, after approval of a magistrate.
29There was clear evidence before the 2016 reforms that the existing law on surveillance
was being stretched and contradicted in spirit, if not according to the letter, by some of
the agencies’ practices. RIPA contained some safeguards against use of external commu-
nications warrants as a substitute for the targeted interception of internal communica-
tions, thus partially addressing one potential concern. What the legislation did not do,
however, was to adequately distinguish between metadata and interception of the
contents of communication in a way corresponding to current technology. As a result,
the weaker controls over gathering metadata allowed for collection of much personal
information that a decade earlier would have only been available under the stricter regime
governing interception of the content of communications. Nor did the legislation contain
any effective safeguards against the transfer of intercepted material to overseas agencies
such as the NSA, or deal adequately with controls over material flowing the other way.
30The distinction between domestic and external interception was in any event called
into question by the disclosures of Edward Snowden which included allegations that the
UK agencies treated communications with overseas based internet platforms (such as
yahoo, Google and Facebook) as subject to the external regime. The Intelligence and
Security Committee revealed in 2015 that the agencies had sought and ministers had
approved “thematic” interception warrants covering defined groups of individuals or
networks, rather than identified individuals.49 Commentators argued that this practice
was of dubious legality under the RIPA50 and the statutory overseer, the Interception of
Communications Commissioner, was plainly uncomfortable with it also, although
stopping short of labelling it unlawful.51
49 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Privacy and Security: A modern and Transparent
Legal Framework (March 2015) HC 1075, para 42 ff.
50 The statutory basis for thematic warrants rests on the definition of a “person” who may be subject to
an external warrant which includes “any organisation or any association or combination of persons”
[Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, S. 8(1)]. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 7(2). aims
to remove any doubt by providing that in the context of a single investigation or operation, a warrant can
also cover a group of linked persons, or to more than one person or organisation, or set of premises.
51 T. Hickman, “The Investigatory Powers Bill: What’s Hot and What’s Not?” U.K. Const. L. Blog (11th
Dec 2015) (available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/).
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31 A series of further admissions and official disclosures followed. The Interception of
Communications Commissioner was asked in January 2015 to review the use of a
hitherto obscure power contained in the Telecommunications Act 1984 to give minis-
terial directions to communications providers on grounds of national security.52 This
provision had its roots in the privatisation of telecommunications and pre-dated the
widespread availability of mobile phones and internet communications but had none-
theless been used, without reporting its use to Parliament, to allow the agencies to
acquire bulk communications data under successive governments.53 Other techniques
that had not previously been acknowledged by the agencies, such as the use of Bulk
Personal Datasets and Computer Network Exploitation (computer hacking) were
publicly avowed.
32 The UK authorities have attempted to frame the debate about non-targeted data
gathering and analysis by careful choice of language, referring to “bulk” powers (in
preference to “mass surveillance”) to acknowledge the large-scale of the enterprise while
nonetheless distinguishing it from universal or indiscriminate intelligence gathering.
The account by the ISC of GCHQ’s practice stresses, however, that only a small (but
unspecified) proportion of internet traffic is collected under these powers, that smaller
proportions still are searched by automated means and only very small proportions of
these will ever be read by a human analyst.54 In an effort to demonstrate the need for
these powers and to garner bi-partisan support an independent review was commis-
sioned from the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism which endorsed the operational
case for the various bulk powers in the IPA 2016.55
33 The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 brings the existing powers for the agencies and
law enforcement bodies for surveillance of communications and access to communica-
tions data together in one place but also significantly extends the powers to cover
additional new technologies and allows access to internet connection records. It gives
comprehensive statutory underpinning for the first time to a variety of “untargeted”
or “bulk surveillance” techniques used by the security and intelligence agencies, in
particular, bulk collection and examination, analysis of bulk personal datasets, and also
to equipment interference. These are discussed in turn below. Together they reflect the
increasing shift in counter-terrorism techniques away from traditional interceptions of
communications and towards the collection and analysis of communications data,
designed to establish the movement and location of individuals, their habits (including
internet browsing), their networks, contacts and travel.
34 Despite the scale of the reforms the government has conceded that the legislation will
need some further amendment before being brought into force with regard to retention
of communications data, following the decision of the CJEU in Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-
och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Tom Watson and
Others.56 In a consultation document issued in November 2017 the government argued,
52 The review was published: Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner, Review of
the Directions given under S. 94 of the Telecommunications Act (1984), July 2016, HC 33.
53 As the Prime Minister acknowledged in a statement to parliament in November 2015: Rt. Hon.
Theresa May MP, H.C. Deb., 4 Nov 2015, col. 971.
54 Privacy and Security 31–32.
55 David Anderson QC, Report of the Bulk Powers Review, Cm. 9326 (August 2016).
56 Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post- och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State
for the Home Department v. Tom Watson and Others, 21 December 2016, CJEU. Following that decision,
the Court of Appeal granted a declaration that insofar as the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers
Act 2014 (since repealed) permitted use of access to retained data collected for the purpose of preventing,
detecting, investigating and prosecuting criminal offences it was not limited to fighting serious crime nor
subject to prior review by a court or independent administrative authority: Watson v. SSHD [2018]
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however, that any changes would affect communications data retention on grounds of
investigation of serious crime but not national security, because of the EU’s lack of
competence in the latter field.57 Others, however, challenge that contention and further
cases are pending to challenge the compatibility of the data retention powers (discussed
below) with European law.58
III. Targeted interception and examination
35Under Part 2, Ch. 1 of the 2016 Act the heads of the three intelligence services and
the Chief of Defence Intelligence may apply to the Secretary of State for an interception
warrant.59 These fall into two main relevant categories: targeted interception warrants
and targeted examination warrants. The latter authorise the examination of material
relating to a person in Britain that has been collected under a bulk interception
warrant.60 The main changes introduced by the 2016 Act are to place added protections
for certain categories of communications onto a statutory footing and to move away
from ministerial warrants by introducing judicial approval.
36An interception warrant may relate to a particular person or organisation, or a single
set of premises. This re-enacts longstanding practice and earlier legislation. The Act also
aims to remove any doubt about the legality of thematic warrants by providing that in
the context of a single investigation or operation it can also cover a group of linked
persons, or to more than one person or organisation, or set of premises.61 It is
questionable, however, whether it complies with the criteria identified by the Grand
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in the Zakharov case which include
the need in order to comply with Art. 8 ECHR to:
“clearly identify a specific person to be placed under surveillance or a single set
of premises as the premises in respect of which authorization is ordered. Such
information may be made by names, addresses, telephone numbers or other relevant
information”62
37Concerning the grounds for a targeted warrant, the Secretary of State may issue an
interception warrant in the interests of national security, for the purpose of preventing
or detecting serious crime, in the interests of the economic well-being of the United
Kingdom (in circumstances relevant to the interests of national security), or for giving
EWCA Civ 70. The Court of Appeal’s judgment does deal with the use of data for national security
purposes (see further pending cases below).
57 Home Office, Investigatory Powers Act 2016, Consultation on the government’s proposed response to
the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union on 21 December 2016 regarding the retention of
communications data (November 2017) 11.
58 The NGO Liberty has made an application for judicial review (to be heard in February 2018) alleging
that the powers under Part IV of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 for retention of communications data
do not comply with the Watson judgment. In addition, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal has made a
preliminary reference to the CJEU to clarify the application of the Watson judgment to Bulk Commu-
nications Data retained by the security and intelligence agencies: Privacy International v. Secretary of
State, UKIP Trib IPT 15 110 CH.
59 The minister must personally consider the application: Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s. 30.
60 A targeted examination warrant is required whenever a member of an intelligence service wishes to
look at material which relates to a person who is known to be in the British Islands and when he or she
believes that it is necessary and proportionate to select the content of that person’s communications for
examination: Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s. 15(3).
61 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 7(2). A warrant may also relate to testing or training activities:
ibid., S. 7 (3).
62 Zahravov v. Russia, Application 47143/06, para 264, European Court of Human Rights, para 264.
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effect to the provisions of a mutual assistance agreement.63 The minister must person-
ally consider the application and be satisfied that the interception is both necessary64
and proportionate to the grounds.
38 Special enhanced safeguards apply if the warrant relates to the communications of
Members of Parliament. Previously it was thought that that the so-called “Wilson
doctrine”65 prevented interception of communications of MPs and Peers as a matter of
constitutional convention. However, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal examined the
practice in 2017 and concluded that the doctrine had no strict legal effect.66 The
Tribunal noted, however, that the agencies were bound by codes and guidance
(disclosed in the proceedings), which imposed considerable preconditions before
parliamentarians’ communications could be accessed and that this regime complied
with the European Convention on Human Rights. The 2016 Act significantly strength-
ens the protection for Members of Parliament’s communications: in these cases the
authorisation of the Prime Minister and a Judicial Commissioner is required.67
39 Additional statutory requirements also apply to protect legally privileged material and
journalistic material.68 The introduction of these protections follow a ruling from the
Investigatory Powers Tribunal in Belhadj & Others v the Security Service & Others69 that
legally privileged material collected under the former legal regime had been unlawfully
intercepted in contravention of Art. 8 ECHR, and ordering its destruction.
40 Following the minister’s approval a Judicial Commissioner considers whether to
approve the warrant (see S. E.III. 1 below for description of judicial oversight), applying
judicial review principles to the Secretary of State’s conclusions with regard to the necessity
and proportionality of the warrant70 and having particular regard to privacy duties.71
Where a Judicial Commissioner refuses to approve a warrant written reasons must be
given by the Commissioner and these may be reconsidered by the Investigatory Powers
Commissioner at the request of the person authorising the warrant. The Investigatory
Powers Commissioner’s decision is final.72
63 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, Ss. 20(2). Sub-s. (4) makes clear that a warrant may only be
considered necessary in the interests of the economic well-being of the UK when it relates to the acts or
intentions of persons outside the British Islands.
64 A warrant cannot be considered necessary if its only purpose is gathering evidence for use in legal
proceedings, or only on the basis that the information that would be obtained relates to trade union
activity in the British Islands [Ss. 20(5) and (6)].
65 Based on a statement to the House of Commons on 20 June 1966 by the then Prime Minister, Harold
Wilson.
66 Caroline Lucas MP, Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb AM, George Galloway vs. the Security Service,
SIS, GCHQ [2017] 1 All ER 283, IPT/14/79/CH IPT/14/80/CH IPT/14/172/CH.
67 S. 26.
68 Ss. 27–29.
69 In Belhadj & Others v. the Security Service & Others IPT/13/132-9/H. And see Privacy International
and Greennet & Others v. (1) The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (2) The
Government Communications Headquarters, IPT 14/85/CH 14/120-126/CH holding that since changes to
the statutory Codes of Practice in 2015 that protection for legally privileged material in relation to
Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) by the services had complied with the ECHR.
70 S. 23.
71 Set out in S. 2.
72 Ss. 23(4) and (5).
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IV. Untargeted “bulk” powers
41Domestic authorisations to obtain communications data are governed by Part 3 of
the 2016 Act. This provides for “bulk acquisition”73 i. e. an instruction to a telecommu-
nications operator to retain communications data74 and disclose it to the intelligence
services75 (or so-called metadata) and for the retention and examination of bulk
personal datasets.76
42Before exercising one of the “bulk” powers, the services must obtain a warrant
authorised by the Secretary of State and approved by a Judicial Commissioner. The
warrants must specify the operational purposes for which any communications data
obtained may be selected for examination. The operational purposes provided for in the
Act are: national security; or national security and the purpose of preventing or
detecting serious crime; or national security and in the interests of the economic well-
being of the United Kingdom.77 The ‘operational purposes’ approved by the Secretary of
State for bulk interception must, however, be specified in greater detail than the general
description ‘national security’, and moreover are required to be shown at 3-monthly
intervals to the Intelligence and Security Committee.78
43When bulk acquisition is used domestically the intelligence services may only collect
communication data rather than the content of the communications.79 This could
nonetheless include the location of mobile and fixed line phones from which calls are
made or received, and the location of computers used to access the internet, the identity
of a subscriber to a telephone service or a detailed telephone bill, websites visited from a
device, email contacts, map searches, GPS location and information about devices
connected to a Wifi network. Such data can, for example, be used by the agencies to
identify members of a terrorist network in contact with a particular email address.80
44Techniques used for foreign surveillance gathering by contrast are more intrusive and
allow for the collection and access of content of communications rather than only
metadata.81 The Act allows bulk collection through “interception of overseas-related
communications”82 (i. e. sent or received by a person outside Britain) and “obtaining
secondary data from such communications”.83 One method used by the intelligence
services is to tap undersea fibre optic cables landing in the United Kingdom in order to
intercept their traffic. Indeed in 2008 the European Court of Human Rights found that a
programme of mass interception of “external” communications passing between the
73 Privacy International challenged the bulk acquisition powers under S. 94 of the Telecommunications
Act 1984 before the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. The IPT ruled that until 4 November 2015 when
stricter safeguards were introduced, the intelligence services were violating the right to private life
(Article 8 of the ECHR): Privacy International v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
[2016] UKIP Trib 15_110-CH, 17 October 2016.
74 Under the terms of the Act communications data refers to the “who”, “when”, “where” and “how” of
a communication, but not its content.: see Ss. 261 and 262.
75 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, Ss 158–175.
76 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, Ss. 199–226.
77 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 138 (bulk interception); S. 158 (bulk acquisition); S. 178 (bulk
equipment interference); Ss. 204 and 205 (bulk personal datasets).
78 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 142 (bulk interception); S. 161 (bulk acquisition); S. 183 (bulk
equipment interference); S. 212 (bulk personal datasets).
79 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 158(6).
80 Anderson, A Question of Trust (2016), p. 159.
81 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, Part 6 Ch. 1.
82 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 136 (2)(a).
83 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 136 (2)(b).
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Republic of Ireland and the UK operated by the Ministry of Defence under warrant
between 1990 and 1997 violated Article 8, because the statutory basis was insufficiently
clear and detailed.84 The provisions governing ministerial approval of “operational
purposes” described above go some way to meet the criticism that the 2016 Act permits
“mass surveillance”. However, the language used to describe these would still allow a
high degree of generality in the authorization of bulk powers and a number of the
controls governing how analysts can query databases of collected data remain in the
form of internal procedures, rather than legal requirements.
V. Bulk personal datasets
45 Bulk personal datasets are large datasets containing information about a large
number of individuals (such as passport holders, driving licence records, voters on the
electoral register) that are incorporated into “analytical systems”. The majority of the
individuals to whom this data relate will not be of any interest to the intelligence
services but they will examine the data relating to the minority who are of intelligence
interest. The data may be acquired by overt or covert means, and include data about
biographical details, commercial and financial activities, communications and travel.
46 Although it is hardly surprising that services access and link personal data in this
way, the existence their use of bulk personal datasets was only confirmed for the first
time in 2015.85 In its Privacy International decision the Investigatory Powers Tribunal
found that the intelligence services had violated the right to private life until 12 March
2015 when stricter safeguards were introduced.86 Whereas previously the agencies claim
of authority to access and use Bulk Personal Datasets rested only on their general
statutory competences, the 2016 Act now gives an express statutory basis for their
retention and use.
47 The 2016 Act defines them as sets of “information that includes personal data
relating to a number of individuals”87 where “the nature of the set is such that the
majority of the individuals are not, and are unlikely to become, of interest to the
intelligence service in the exercise of its functions”.88 It provides that BPDs may not be
retained or examined by an intelligence agency unless authorised by warrant.89 War-
rants are of two kinds: Class or Specific BPDs.90
48 An intelligence agency is prevented from using a class BPD warrant to access a
dataset that consists of health records or if a substantial proportion of the dataset
consists of sensitive personal data.91 For this purpose, the definition of “sensitive
personal data” corresponds to that for data protection purposes i. e. a person’s racial or
ethnic origins, political or religious beliefs, trade union membership, health, sexual life,
and criminal record.92 A restriction also prohibits retention or examination of a BPD in
reliance on a class BPD warrant if the head of the intelligence service considers that the
84 Liberty and Others v. United Kingdom, Applicationno. 58243/00, E Ct HR, 1 July 2008.
85 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (2015), Ch. 7.
86 Investigatory Powers Tribunal, [2016] UKIPTrib 15_110-CH, 17 October 2016.
87 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 199 (1)(a).
88 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 199 (1)(b).
89 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 200.
90 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, Ss. 204 and 205, respectively.
91 S. 202(1). Nor may an intelligence service retain, or retain and examine, a BPD in reliance on a class
BPD warrant if the head of the intelligence service considers [the BPD consists of, or includes such
personal data (s. 202(2)].
92 Data Protection Act 1998, S. 2(a)-(f).
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nature of the BPD raises novel or contentious issues which ought to be considered by
the Secretary of State and a Judicial Commissioner.
VI. Equipment interference
49Part V of the 2016 Act gives for the first time explicit powers for interference by the
agencies with equipment (typically, computers and mobile devices). Hitherto the
agencies have relied on less specific powers to interfere with property, which in public
accounts had been associated with covert entry to premises in order to search, place or
recover surveillance devices. In its Greenmet decision the Investigatory Powers
Tribunal found that existing powers for property interference warrants (under S. 5 of
the Intelligence Services Act 1994 and with reference the statutory Codes of Practice)
could in principle be used to allow GCHQ to carry out Computer Network Exploita-
tion (CNE) and gave guidance over how specific a warrant would have to be in order
to be lawful both at domestic law and so as to comply with Articles 8 and 10 of the
ECHR.93 The Tribunal reached no conclusion whether s. 7 of the Intelligence Services
Act 1994 (which allows ministerial authorization of otherwise unlawful extra-territor-
ial acts by the services) could lawfully authorize CNE outside the British Islands,
because of its uncertainty over whether the Convention would apply, at least in
relation to a hypothetical case. The 2016 Act covers the topic explicitly and provides
for equipment interference warrants to be issued by the Secretary of State94 and to be
approved by a Judicial Commissioner.95 If the Commissioner refuses to approve the
warrant the agency may ask the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to review the
decision.96
50Bulk equipment interference97 is only permitted if outside Britain.98 It covers ‘hacking
or the implantation of software into endpoint devices or network infrastructure to
retrieve intelligence, but [they] may also include, for example, copying data directly
from a computer’.99 Presumably also, though not explicitly acknowledged, the inter-
ference could take the form of implanting malware in a cyber-attack. It is alleged, for
example, that GCHQ participated, together with US and Israeli agencies, in the
development of the so-called Olympic Games virus to disable critical infrastructure in
advance of a potential Israeli attack on the Iranian nuclear programme.100
93 Privacy International and Greenmet & Others v. (1) The Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs (2) The Government Communications Headquarters, IPT 14/85/CH 14/120-126/
CH.
94 Investigatory Powers Act 2016,S. 102. A warrant can only be issued if it is necessary in the interests
of national security, for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, or in the interests of the
economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom (so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of
national security) (s.102(5)) and proportionate to the intended outcome.
95 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 108.
96 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 108(5).
97 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, Part 7.
98 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 176(1)(c). Prior to the entry into force of the Investigatory Powers
Act 2016, bulk powers interference had never been used in the United Kingdom. Anderson, D. (2016),
184.
99 Anderson, A Question of Trust, (2016), 34.
100 ‘Zero Day: Nuclear Cyber Sabotage’, BBC television, 16 Jan 2017.
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VII. The judicial approval process
51 The ‘double-lock,’ approval process introduced in the 2016 Act requires that warrants
or notices for both targeted surveillance and bulk powers be authorised by the Secretary
of State101 and subsequently approved by the Judicial Commissioner.102 Judicial Com-
missioners must hold or must have held a high judicial office.103 The ‘double-lock,’ is a
major change and replaces a procedure dating back to the sixteenth century under
which ministers alone were responsible for issuing warrants for interception.
52 This change follows longstanding criticism that the system of ministerial warrants
lacked the independence and rigour of a judicial process in protecting human rights
and was out of line with international practice. These considerations, together with the
pragmatic argument that a judicial process was more likely to persuade the major US
communications providers to cooperate with requests from the UK agencies,104 led
to proposals to put final approval in the hands of a Judicial Commissioner. The
Intelligence and Security Committee had suggested that ministers should continue to
issue warrants rather than judges because they were better able to judge the wider
public interest, as well as the diplomatic and political context, while being politically
responsible for decisions to authorize surveillance.105 As the Independent Reviewer
pointed out, however, in view of the secrecy surrounding surveillance, responsibility
was notional rather than a realistic prospect of being called to account. He recom-
mended a system of judicial warrants, with a variation of a mixed system in the case of
national security warrants relating defence and foreign affairs. The latter system would
retain the advantages of ministerial approval but place consideration of more dis-
tinctly legal questions into the hands of a Judicial Commissioner.106 It is a variation on
this division of labour, applying it more widely, that has been implemented in the
‘dual lock’ provisions.
53 Under the process the Commissioner is required to review whether the warrant or
notice is necessary and whether the measures applied for are proportionate.107 Warrants
are valid for six months,108 and retention notices can require the retention of data for 12
months.109 In urgent cases a warrant can be issued for targeted interception and
equipment interference and as well as for bulk interception and bulk datasets without
the prior approval of the Judicial Commissioner.110 In these cases, however, the
Commissioner must be notified and can decide whether they approve the warrant or
not within three working days after the date of issue. In cases of refusal to approve a
101 Investigatory Powers Act, s. 19 for interception and examination, s. 87 for retention of communica-
tions data, s. 102 for equipment interference.
102 Investigatory Powers Act, s. 23 for interception and examination; and S. 87 (1) (b) for retention
notices, S. 102 (1) (d).
103 Investigatory Powers Act, S. 227 (2).
104 A Question of Trust 207.
105 Privacy and Security 119.
106 A Question of Trust, 274.
107 Investigatory Powers Act, S. 23 (1) for interception and examination, S. 89 (1) for retention,
S. 108 (1) for equipment interference.
108 Investigatory Powers Act, S. 32 (2) (b) for interception and examination, S. 116 (2) (b) for
equipment interference.
109 Investigatory Powers Act, S. 87 (3).
110 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, Ss. 24 and 109 for targeted interception and examination, and
equipment interference warrants respectively. S. 180 for bulk equipment interference, s. 209 for bulk
personal datasets.
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warrant, then the implementing authority must, “so far as is reasonably practicable,
secure that anything in the process of being done under the warrant stops as soon as
possible”.111 The Commissioner may also decide whether to request the destruction of
any material collected or may impose conditions on its use or retention.112
E. Accountability of the agencies
I. Ministerial responsibility and control
54Ministerial responsibility for the Security Service is through the Home Secretary,
although operational control is in the hands of the Director-General. SIS and GCHQ
both come under the authority of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs. Operational control is in the hands of the Chief and Director, respectively, who
are appointed by the minister.113 Each agency head is required to give an annual report
to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State.
55It would be wrong, however, to equate the position of the agencies with conventional
government departments of state, responsible to a Secretary of State. There is a marked
departure from the British constitutional position by which ministers are legally
responsible and officials are anonymous and, legally-speaking, invisible. Statutory
provisions give the heads of the agencies a right of direct access to the Prime Minister114
who, despite the services’ departmental associations, has traditionally assumed overall
control and acted as the government mouthpiece on intelligence matters.115 Moreover,
unlike normal civil service heads of department the Director-General of the Security
Service, the Chief of the SIS and the Director of GCHQ are named in law as having day
to day responsibility. The reason is undoubtedly to provide a safeguard of the services’
neutrality in party political terms. Indeed, political neutrality is explicitly addressed by
provisions that require the heads of all three agencies to ensure that the services do not
take any steps to further the interests of any UK political party.116
56Furthermore, some of the services’ actions require explicit ministerial approval by the
responsible Secretary of State. Unlike many other countries in which judicial authorisa-
tion is required, in the UK the tradition has been for telephone tapping or mail opening
(which may also be undertaken by the police) to be approved by the Secretary of State
under warrant.117 This process will, however, be modified by the addition of a process of
judicial confirmation once the ‘dual lock’ system under the Investigatory Powers Act
2016 comes into force. Another instance where ministers are given specific powers
concerning individuals is the field of detention of terrorist suspects and the deportation
of foreign nationals on grounds of national security.118 Diligent ministers will clearly
require convincing and detailed supporting evidence from the agencies before they
approve such actions. In the current context of use of counter-terrorist powers, for
111 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, Ss. 25 (2); 110 (2); 181 (2); 210 (2) respectively.
112 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 25 (3).
113 Intelligence Services Act, Ss. 2 and 4.
114 Security Service Act 1989, S. 2(4) and Intelligence Services Act 1994, Ss. 2(4) and 4(4).
115 See also: R. Aldrich and R Cormac, The Black Door: Spies, Secret Intelligence and British Prime
Ministers (Harper Collins, 2016).
116 Security Service Act 1989, S. 2; Intelligence Services Act 1994 1994, Ss. 2 and 4.
117 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Part 1. In practice, the Home Secretary, Foreign
Secretary, Northern Ireland Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, and the Second Minister in
Scotland.
118 Under the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 and the Immigration Act 1971.
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example, a close and continuous dialogue between the Home Secretary, her officials and
the Security Service is inevitable. Similarly the implications of the actions of SIS and
GCHQ for diplomatic and foreign relations create an imperative for consultation with
the Foreign Secretary. In some instances this is buttressed by legal requirements also:
when immunity is required from legal liability under UK law for actions abroad (i. e. for
offences over which the UK courts exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction) the Foreign
Secretary may give authorisation under section 7 of the (Intelligence Services Act 1994.
57 The budgets of the agencies are set by ministers through the Single Intelligence
Account (SIA) as part of the government-wide periodic Spending Review mechanism.
Individual agency budgets are not published annually because the information is
deemed sensitive. The Prime Minister’ s National Security Adviser is the Principal
Accounting Officer for the SIA. Defence Intelligence and the central intelligence
machinery are funded separately through the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet
Office respectively. JTAC is funded by the various departments and agencies contribut-
ing staff with additional costs covered through the SIA.
II. Parliamentary oversight119
58 The Intelligence and Security Committee (‘ISC’), was established under the Intelli-
gence Services Act 1994 to examine all three security and intelligence services. The
Justice and Security Act 2013 made some (mostly minor) changes to the ISC’s
composition, reporting and remit and is the current legislation.
59 Under the Justice and Security Act 2013 the ISC was re-designated as the Intelligence
and Security Committee of Parliament (emphasis added), with a remit to examine the
expenditure, policy and administration of all three security and intelligence agencies.120
This is a subtle difference which the government argued would make the Committee
‘demonstrably accountable to Parliament’.121 The ISC can oversee other parts of the
intelligence community under a memorandum of understanding agreed with the Prime
Minister.122 It has restricted powers to examine operational matters where the agencies
volunteer information or (in the case historic operations) where requested by the Prime
Minister and both the committee and the Prime Minister consider it to be of significant
national interest.123
60 Unlike a select committee the ISC is governed by legislation, rather than the standing
orders of Parliament. The legislation governs the appointment of its members, the
procedure it adopts, its powers over witnesses and hearings, and the publication of its
reports. It comprises nine Parliamentarians from both Houses, appointed by the
respective Houses (to be eligible however they must be nominated by the Prime
Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition).124 Parliament can veto
119 On parliamentary handling of intelligence more generally, see: I. Leigh and L. Lustgarten, In From
the Cold, Ch. 16; A.Horne and C. Walker, ‘Parliament and National Security’ in Horne, A. and Le Sueur,
A. (eds.), Parliament: Legislation and Accountability (Hart, Oxford, 2016); V. Fikfak and H.Hooper,
Parliament’s Secret War (Hart, Oxford 2018).
120 Justice and Security Act 2013, S. 2(1). The agencies’ expenditure is audited under arrangements with
the National Audit Office. The Chair of the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee is also
shown the relevant details.
121 Ministry of Justice, Justice and Security Green Paper (2011), Cm 8194: para 3.20; and para 3.25–3.32,
discussing incidental changes to the appointment of the members and Chair of the ISC and to the
arrangements for its accommodation, staffing and budget.
122 Justice and Security Act 2013, Ss. 2(2) and (5). On this basis it also examines Defence Intelligence.
123 Justice and Security Act 2013, S. 3.
124 Justice and Security Act 2013, S. 1 (3) and (4)(a).
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the Prime Minister’s nominees to the Committee but does not have a free choice of
nominees. Current Ministers of the Crown are legally debarred from being members of
the committee.125
61Certain additional practices have supplemented the statutory provisions. The compo-
sition has usually been eight members of the House of Commons and one member of
the House of Lords. Members have frequently included past holders of ministerial office
with experience of responsibility for security and intelligence (including past Foreign,
Defence and Home Secretaries) and retired senior civil servants. In the past Prime
Ministers have made conspicuous use of the patronage of appointing the chair of
the ISC: the chair has been held by a succession of ex-ministers from the party of
government. Arguably, confidence in the independence of the committee has been
weakened by the failure to rotate the chairmanship with the Opposition.126 Under the
changes introduced in 2013 the Chair is chosen by the Committee itself, rather than by
the Prime Minister.127 The ISC now also reports direct to Parliament but must send its
reports beforehand to the Prime Minister and exclude matters that the Prime Minister
considers would be prejudicial to the agencies.128 This is a minor symbolic change to the
previous practice whereby the report was to the Prime Minster who then laid it before
Parliament. Despite the changes the ISC falls short of being under full control of
Parliament in the same way as a select committee.129
62Although the ISC has power to send for persons and papers, in other respects its
information-gathering powers are limited. The agency heads may refuse to disclose
‘sensitive information’130 ie information that might lead to the identification of sources,
other forms of assistance given to the agencies, or operational methods; information
concerning past, present, or future specific operations; or, information provided by a
foreign government which does not consent to its disclosure is included. Within these
categories refusal is discretionary.
63In practice the ISC works by consensus, perhaps because it meets almost exclusively
in private. The published reports do not record formal disagreement or voting among
members of the Committee and nor have there been any published minority reports.
Nevertheless in the past the Committee has arguably been hampered in its work by
being too closely associated with the agencies- particularly when tackling controversial
topics such as intelligence before the Iraq war, the 7 July 2005 bombings in London131
and allegations of complicity in torture.132 As a consequence of the inability of the ISC
to produce definitive reports that allayed public concern and mistrust surrounding these
topics there have been several ad hoc inquiries into topics that the ISC has already
investigated, for example the Butler review, the special inquest into the 7/7 bombings.133
The perception that the oversight regime was failing to provide public assurance that
125 Justice and Security Act 2013, S. (4)(b).
126 It appeared that a convention of this kind (or of rotating the chair between parties) might emerge
when the Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair retained Tom King (a former Conservative minister) as
Chair of the ISC following the 1997 election. However, on King’s departure there followed a succession of
appointments of ex-ministers from the ruling party.
127 Justice and Security Act 2013, s. 1(6).
128 Justice and Security Act 2013, s. 3.
129 As advocated by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Allegations of UK Complicity in Torture,
23rd Report for 2008–9, HL 152/HC 230 (2009). For earlier similar proposals see Home Affairs Select
Committee, Accountability of the Security Service, HC (1998–99), p. 291.
130 Justice and Security Act 2013, Sched. 1.
131 Intelligence and Security Committee 2006. Report into the London Terrorist Attacks of 7 July 2005,
Cm 6785; Intelligence and Security Committee 2007, Rendition, Cm. 7171 (July 2007).
132 Joint Committee on Human Rights 2009, 23rd Report for 2008–9, HL 152/HC 230.
133 Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, H.C. 1087 (2005–6).
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the agencies were acting efficiently and with propriety was undoubtedly a major
contributing factor to the 2013 reform of the Committee’s status and powers. None-
theless, a MORI survey in 2014 found that 48 % of these survey were “not at all
confident” or “not very confident” in the system of oversight in holding the agencies
to account, compared to 40 % who were “fairly confident” or “very confident”.134
64 The ISC has now been in operation for over more than two decades under some 7
different chairs and consequently it is difficult to generalise about its effectiveness.
Commentators have given its work mixed reviews.135 Most accept that it has built up a
relationship of trust with the agencies (with only exceptional leaks of confidential
material) and that this has enabled it to investigate matters above and beyond those in
its remit, including some with operational aspects. It has been seen as fulfilling an
educative role in bridging the secret and political worlds.136 Others, however, have seen
the relationship with the agencies as too close, sometimes bordering on advocacy,137 or
on occasion naïve, have criticised it for lack of ambition138 and inattention to human
rights concerns,139 and have contrasted the quality of its investigations with those other
inquiries.140
III. Judicial oversight141
1.The Commissioners
65 The agencies are also overseen by judicial Commissioners, who were appointed initially
under the 1989 and 1994 Acts but currently work within the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000. These procedures were initially introduced in a (successful) attempt to
ward off a finding that the previous regime violated the European Convention on Human
134 Ibid., 39.
135 P. Gill, “Evaluating Intelligence Oversight Committees: the case of the UK Intelligence Security
Committee and the ‘War on Terror’ “Intelligence and National Security, 22(1) 14–37 (2207); I. Leigh,
“Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence in the UK: A Critical Evaluation” in H. Born and M. Caparini
(eds.) Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants (Aldershot: Ashgate
2007); A. Glees, J. Morrison and P. Davies, The Open Side of Secrecy: Britain’s Intelligence and Security
Committee (London: Social Affairs Unit, 2006); M. Pythian, ‘A Very British Institution’: The Intelligence
and Security Committee and Intelligence Accountability in the United Kingdom’, in Loch K. Johnson
(ed.), Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (New York, Oxford University Press, 2010),
699–718; M. Pythian, “The British Experience with Intelligence Accountability: The First Twenty Years”,
in Loch K. Johnson (ed.) Essentials of Strategic Intelligence (Santa Barbara, CA, Praeger Security
International, 2015), 447–69; H.Bochel, A. Defty, J. Kirkpatrick “New mechanisms of independent
accountability: select committees and Parliamentary scrutiny of the intelligence services” Parliamentary
Affairs, 68 (2) 314–331 (2015).
136 A. Defty, “Educating parliamentarians about intelligence: the role of the British Intelligence and
Security Committee” (2008) 61(4) Parliamentary Affairs 621–641.
137 See, for example, its criticism of US-based internet companies for their lack of cooperation with the
agencies: Intelligence and Security Committee, Report on the intelligence relating to the murder of Fusilier
Lee Rigby, 139–151.
138 P. Gill, “The ISC and the Challenge of International Security Networks”, Review of International
Studies 35 (2009) p. 932.
139 I. Leigh, “Rebalancing Rights and National Security: Reforming UK Intelligence Oversight a Decade
After 9/11” (2012) 27 (5) Intelligence and National Security 721–737.
140 R. Aldrich, “Whitehall and the Iraq War: the UK’s Four Intelligence Enquiries” Irish Studies in
International Affairs, 16 (2005), 73–88.
141 In addition to the methods described here judges are from time to time to called upon by the
government to conduct ad hoc inquiries into matters of public concern involving intelligence: I.
Leigh,”The Role of Judges” in S. Farson and M.Pythian (eds), Commissions of Inquiry and National
Security: Comparative Approaches (Praeger, 2010), ch. 16.
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Rights.142 The legislation is in the process of being supeceded by the Investigatory Powers
Act 2016, the oversight arrangements of which are being introduced in phases, from
spring 2018. Formerly the Intelligence Services Commissioner was responsible for
reviewing and reporting upon the issue and authorization, by the relevant minister, of
warrants for operations by the Agencies.143 The Interception Commissioner (established
under S. 57 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000) reviewed the issue and
authorization of warrants to intercept mail and telecommunications by the intelligence
and security Agencies and law enforcement organizations.
66The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 makes significant changes to this scheme by Act
bringing together in a single and more powerful judicial Commissioner’s office the
various oversight Commissioners established under earlier legislation (so abolishing the
offices of the Interception Commissioner and Intelligence Services Commissioner). The
new Investigatory Powers Commissioner (‘IPC’) must hold or must have held a high
judicial office144 but the Commissioner’s role is distinct from that of the Judicial
Commissioners under the Act.145 The role of the office is to keep under review the
majority of the targeted and bulk surveillance powers available to the intelligence
services,146 especially with regard to the operation of safeguards to protect privacy.147
The security and intelligence services are required to disclose or provide all the
necessary documents and information for the purposes of the IPC’s functions148 and
to give any assistance the IPC requires in accessing apparatus, systems or other facilities
of the intelligence services when exercising oversight functions.149 The IPC is required
to report annually150 or at any time requested by the Prime Minister151 or where the
Commissioner considers it appropriate.152 The Prime Minister is obliged to publish the
Commissioner’s annual reports and to lay a copy of it before Parliament, together with a
statement whether any matter has been excluded.153 In excluding material on the
permitted grounds154 the Prime Minster is required to consult with the Commis-
sioner.155
67The creation of the IPC combats the fragmentation of oversight in which multiple
actors had responsibility for examining a narrow function of the agencies or a specific
type of review. Instead the IPC brings these functions together, with the possibility of
benefiting from joining up or cross-fertilisation from these different oversight activities.
The resources available to the new office (the IPC has 50 staff), also underline the trend
142 The 1989 Act was treated as sufficient reason by the Convention organs to take no further action in
cases brought (by Patricia Hewitt and Harriet Harman and dating to their involvement with the National
Council for Civil Liberties) involving alleged surveillance and recording of personal details by the Security
Service: Council of Europe Resolution DH(90) 36 of 13 December 1990. Later decisions have confirmed
that system of Commissioners and tribunal has been found to satisfy Art. 6, 8 and 13 of the European
Convention on Human Rights: Case of Kennedy v UK, App. no. 26839/05, European Court of Human
Rights, 18 May 2010. See also: Esbester v. UK, App. no. 18601/91, 2 April 1993; G, H, and I v. UK (1993),
15 EHRR CD 4.
143 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, S. 59.
144 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 227 (2).
145 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 229 (4).
146 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 229 (1).
147 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 229 (5).
148 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 235 (2).
149 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 235 (3) and (4).
150 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 234 (1).
151 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 234 (3).
152 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 234 (4).
153 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 234 (6).
154 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 234 (7).
155 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 234 (7).
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towards expert review. Following the recommendation of the Bulk Powers Review there
is a new technical advisory panel to assist the Commissioner’s office.156 Moreover,
instead of being a responsive institution that either reports or is tasked the IPC has
own-initiative powers to conduct thematic reviews of capabilities and to investigate
serious errors.157
2. Investigatory Powers Tribunal
68 A specialist body the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (the ‘IPT’), has been established to
investigate public complaints against the agencies or allegations of illegal interception by
them.158 Members of the tribunal must hold or have held high judicial office or be
qualified lawyers of at least ten years’ standing. Any person may bring a claim and the
IPT must determine all claims brought before it, except those it considers to be vexatious
or frivolous.159 The IPT is specified as the only appropriate forum for proceedings against
any of the intelligence services concerning alleged incompatibility with European Con-
vention rights and for complaints by persons who allege to have been subject to the
investigatory powers of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act.160 It has jurisdiction
to investigate any complaint that a person’s communications have been intercepted and,
where interception has occurred, to examine the authority for such interception. It is
required to follow the principles applicable by a court on an application for judicial
review161 and can require anyone involved in the authorisation and execution of an
interception warrant to disclose or provide documents and information162 and all such
assistance as it thinks fit from a relevant Commissioner.163 At the conclusion of proceed-
ings the IPT is required to give a simple statement either that they have found in favour of
the complainant (i. e. that there has been unlawful action against him or her) or that ‘ no
determination has been made in his favour’.164 This safeguards information about the
agencies so that proceedings cannot be used to discover whether or not a person is
lawfully under surveillance. In the event of a successful claim the IPT is also required to
submit a report to the Prime Minister.165 The IPT has the power to award compensation
and to make such other orders as it thinks fit, including orders quashing or cancelling
interception warrants and requiring the destruction of any records so obtained.166 There is
currently no appeal,167 although once in force the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 will
introduce an appeal on a point of law to the Court of Appeal.168 The procedure before the
IPT has been found to be compatible with Article 6 of the ECHR.169
156 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, Ss.246 and 247.
157 See below.
158 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, S. 65.
159 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Ss. 67(1), (4) and (5).
160 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, S. 65(2). In R (A) v Director of Establishments of the
Security Service [2009] UKSC 12; [2010] 2 AC 1 the UK Supreme Court confirmed that this provision
prevented other courts from hearing claims under S. 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 against any of the
intelligence services.
161 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Ss. 67(2) and 67(3)(c).
162 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Ss. 68(6) and (7).
163 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, S. 68(2).
164 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, S. 68(4).
165 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, S. 68(5).
166 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, S. 67(7).
167 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, S. 67(8). This provision has also been held by the Court of
Appeal to preclude judicial review of the Tribunal’s decisions: R (Privacy International) v. Investigatory
Powers Tribunal [2017] EWCA Civ 1868.
168 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 242.
169 Kennedy v UK (2011) 52 EHRR 4.
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69Despite the restrictions built into the statutory scheme, in a series of careful
judgments (mostly arising from the Snowden allegations) the IPT has succeeded in
crafting within its limited powers a procedure for dealing with serious allegations
notwithstanding the agencies’ policy to neither confirm nor deny them. This procedure
allows for the relevant legal arguments to be determined on the basis of “hypothetical
facts”. Consequently, the IPT is able to make a binding pronouncement of legal
principle even if it is unrealistic for the claimant to be able to discharge the burden of
proof. This procedure was adopted by the IPT in dealing with the claim brought by
Privacy International and other NGOs that the alleged involvement of the GCHQ in the
PRISM and TEMPORA programmes was unlawful.170 The Investigatory Powers Tribu-
nal found that GCHQ involvement in the TEMPORA programme, alleged by Snowden,
lacked a basis in domestic law. It held that the searching by GCHQ of bulk data
collected by the NSA had been in violation of Art. 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights but that this defect had been cured for the future by the disclosure
(during the proceedings in question) of previously secret internal guidance.171 A similar
approach was followed by the IPT in its Greenmet decision, holding that since changes
to the statutory Codes of Practice in 2015 protection for legally privileged material in
relation to Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) by the services had complied with
the ECHR.172 It remains to be seen whether this approach to the foreseeability and
accessibility tests under Art. 8 (2), which essentially allows the agencies to benefit from
previously secret internal procedures disclosed only at the courtroom door, will be
accepted by the Strasbourg court.173 Nonetheless the IPT, which was previously a rather
under-rated body, has earned a measure of respect for these and other decisions which
show careful analysis and some robustness in dealing with claims from the agencies. A
notable instance was its ruling in in Belhadj & Others v the Security Service & Others174
that legally privileged material had been unlawfully intercepted in contravention of
Article 8 ECHR and ordering its destruction. In the words of the Independent Reviewer
of Terrorism Legislation, the IPT has ‘stepped out of the shadows’.175
70The Tribunal may be further strengthened by changes in the 2016 Act connecting the
IPT’s complaints-based jurisdiction and the IPC’s audit role. The existing duty of the
Commissioner to assist the IPT has been supplemented by a duty to give the Tribunal
the Commissioner’s opinion on relevant matters, which will allow the Commissioner’s
expertise to assist the Tribunal.176 There is also a duty to inform a person affected by a
serious error (i. e. one that has caused them significant prejudice or harm) in matters
under the Commissioner’s review where the Commissioner determines that this is in
the public interest.177 The person concerned must also be informed of their right to
apply to the IPT and given sufficient details to enable them to do so. This is should
make it substantially easier to bring a successful complaint to the IPT against the
security and intelligence agencies in appropriate cases, although much will turn on the
170 Liberty and others v The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and others, Case
Nos. IPT/13/77/CH; 13/92/CH; 13/194/C and 13/204/CH, [2015] UKIPTrib 13_77 –H.
171 Liberty and others v. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and others, no.
IPT/13/77/CH; 13/92/CH; 13/194/C and 13/204/CH, [2015] UKIP Trib 13_77 –H at 153–154.
172 Privacy International and Greenmet & Others v. (1) The Secretary of State for Foreign and Common-
wealth Affairs (2) The Government Communications Headquarters, IPT 14/85/CH 14/120-126/CH.
173 Similar questions are pending before the European Court of Human Rights: Big Brother Watch and
Others v. the United Kingdom,no. 58170/13, 7 January 2014.
174 In Belhadj & Others v the Security Service & Others IPT/13/132-9/H.
175 A Question of Trust, para. 6.107.
176 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 232.
177 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 231.
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IPC’s assessment of when it is in the public interest to inform the individual concerned.
In principle the hand of the IPT in reaching its own assessments (and consequently
public confidence in the process) should also be strengthened by the enhanced power to
draw on the expertise of the IPC. At the same time the IPT has introduced the
procedural innovation of appointing counsel to the tribunal to assist it in challenging
material from the security and intelligence agencies.178
F. Intelligence and the courts
I. The courts and deference to national security
71 The courts themselves have long recognized that decisions based on national security
are for the government and that judges have neither the necessary information nor the
competence to assess these questions. Famously in the 1984 GCHQ case (concerning the
legality of the government’s ban on trade union membership) Lord Diplock explained:
“National security is the responsibility of the executive government; what action is
needed to protect those interests is ….a matter upon which those upon whom the
responsibility rests, and not the courts of justice, must have the last word. It is par
excellence a non-justiciable question. The judicial process is totally inept to deal with
the sort of problems which it involves.”179
72 This approach has been followed both in wartime and in peacetime in a line of
judicial decisions now dating back a century, to the First World War.180 Perhaps the
high point of judicial deference to governmental claims of national security in modern
times came in Lord Denning’s 1977 judgment in the case of an unsuccessful challenge
brought by the American journalist Mark Hosenball to his deportation on national
security grounds following magazine article that he had written about GCHQ. His
Lordship stated that the rules of natural justice (which would have normally required
disclosure of material to allow Hosenball to challenge the decision) had to be ‘modified’
when security was at stake:
“There is a conflict here between the interests of national security on the one hand
and the freedom of the individual on the other. The balance between these two is not
for a court of law. It is for the Home Secretary.”181
73 Following 9/11 a more sceptical attitude prevails. For example, where the government
advances arguments that are contradictory or has chosen measures that interfere
disproportionately with individual rights then the courts do now intervene- as the
House of Lords’ landmark decision in the Bellmarsh detainees’ case shows. The House
of Lords ruled that the provisions in Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security
Act 2001 dealing with detention without trial of non-nationals were incompatible with
the European Convention, despite a purported derogation from Article 5 (the right to
liberty).182 A majority of the court found that because of the potentially devastating
178 As recommended by the Independent Surveillance Review, A Democratic Licence to Operate 113.
179 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374, 412.
180 L. Lustgarten and I. Leigh, In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy
(Oxford, 1994) ch. 12.
181 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Hosenball [1977] 3 All E.R. 452, 461.
182 A (FC) and Others (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2
WLR 87.
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consequences of an attack the government was not wrong to invoke the derogation, but
that the powers that it claimed on this basis were disproportionate. Some of the judicial
comments are worth noting for comparison to earlier statements from the bench. Lord
Scott, while deferring to the Secretary of State on whether there was a public emergency
within Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, nevertheless expressed
‘very great doubt’ whether it threatened the life of the nation and referred to the ‘faulty
intelligence assessments’ prior to the Iraq war.183 In his speech Lord Hoffmann was
more candid still, referring to ‘the widespread scepticism which has attached to
intelligence assessments since the fiasco over Iraqi weapons of mass destruction’.184
Nonetheless, the constitutional objection to the judiciary over-ruling the government
on matters of national security relied on by the majority of the judges in the Bellmarsh
decision in holding that they could not question the government’s assertion that there
existed a public emergency.
74The loosening of the deference doctrine has encouraged a flood of actions in the
regular courts (in addition to challenges in the IPT) against the intelligence services
arising from alleged abuses in the “War against Terror” and involving the question of
intelligence cooperation with international partners.185 These include a challenge to the
legality of the ministerial guidance issued to cover the conduct of intelligence officers
dealing with intelligence partners, who have suspects in detention,186 to the alleged
supply of location information by GCHQ to the US for overseas drone attacks,187 and to
the alleged involvement of MI6 with US authorities in an alleged rendition.188
75In a number of instances lawyers representing litigants claiming to have suffered
human rights abuses at the hands of foreign intelligence services have brought proceed-
ings against UK authorities for disclosure of any related intelligence they may have
received from the services in the counties accused of wrongdoing that could assist the
claim in foreign courts.189 This strategy was used in Binyam Mohammed190 and several
other prominent cases.191 Binyam Mohammed was brought by a former Guantanamo
Bay detainee to force the Foreign Secretary to disclose potentially exculpatory material,
based on reports from the US Government to MI5 and MI6, concerning his alleged
torture in Pakistan. He had also been rendered by the US to Morocco and tortured
there. After protracted litigation the Court of Appeal confirmed that, notwithstanding
183 Ibid., para. 154.
184 ibid., para. 94.
185 I. Leigh, ‘National Courts and International Intelligence Cooperation’ in H. Born, I. Leigh and A.
Wills (eds.), International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability, (Routledge, 2011) ; C. Murray,
‘Out of the Shadows: the Courts and the United Kingdom’s Malfunctioning Counter-Terrorism Partner-
ships’, Journal of Conflict & Security Law 2013, 18(2), 193–232.
186 Equality and Human Rights Commission v Prime Minister [2011] EWHC 2401 (Admin), [2012] 1
WLR 1389 (unsuccessful).
187 R (application of Khan) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2014] All ER
(D) 112 (Jan); [2014] EWCA Civ 24. The legality of alleged passing by GCHQ to the US of locational
information to CIA for drone attacks in Pakistan unsuccessfully challenged because the court refused to
make a declaration that would involve judging the acts of a sovereign foreign government (the USA) and
because of the hypothetical nature of the alleged criminality involving GCHQ officials.
188 Belhaj v Straw and others [2017] UKSC 3, in which the Supreme Court held that action against UK
officials for complicity in wrongdoing by US officials overseas was not barred by the doctrines of state
immunity or foreign act of state.
189 The so-called Norwich Pharmacal remedy (which takes its name from the case of Norwich
Pharmacal v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1974] AC 133) allows a litigant to seek disclosure of
evidence from third parties to litigation in this way.
190 R (Binyam Mohammed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2010] EWCA
Civ 65.
191 Al Rawi and others v Security Service [2011] UKSC 34.
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the importance of intelligence cooperation, the public interest in discussion of allega-
tions of complicity in torture outweighed the objections of the US authorities.192
II. Evidential protections and intelligence
1. Public interest immunity193
76 Traditionally the common law protected intelligence from examination in legal
proceedings through the doctrine of public interest immunity in civil cases (the doctrine
cannot be used in criminal cases). This allows for a minister to claim through a signed
certificate that to allow the material covered by the certificate to be adduced would be
contrary to the public interest. This procedure is controversial because the exclusion of
secret material may effectively prevent individuals with a sound legal claim against the
government for alleged wrongs by intelligence agencies/officials from pursuing them
because of suppression of available evidence for essentially procedural reasons.
Although at one time these certificates were treated as conclusive by the courts, the
modern practice allows the court to inspect the contested material and weigh the claim
against other interests, ordering disclosure if it so chooses.194 Where the court finds that
exclusion is justified there is the reassurance that the secrecy claim has been confirmed
by an independent body. If, on the other hand, the challenge to the certificate is upheld
it may lead to the government seeking to settle or discontinue proceedings to avoid
complying with an adverse judicial ruling to disclose intelligence considered to be
damaging to national security.195
77 Public Interest Immunity has clear limitations, however, which have led in recent
years to the devising of alternative means to protect intelligence material in litigation.
The option of settling a claim to avoid disclosure in the event of an adverse judicial
ruling is not a possibility, however, when the government is only a third party to
litigation, joined because as an intelligence partner it may have relevant information
relating to proceedings that are brought against foreign officials or agencies. This has
been a partial explanation for the UK Government seeking to regain a measure of
control by introducing Closed Material Procedures under the Justice and Security Act
2013 (described below). Moreover, exclusion of material prevents the government also
from relying on it in order to defend or justify powers, such as executive measures based
192 The High Court had initially acceded to the Foreign Secretary’s request to maintain passages
redacted from earlier judgments in the face of threats from the US to re-evaluate its intelligence sharing
with the UK if these details (based on reports from the US government to MI5 and MI6 about Binyam
Mohammed’s treatment) were published: R (Binyam Mohammed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs [2009] EWHC 152 (Admin). The court later revisited its conclusion in the light of
new information that became available: R (Binyam Mohammed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs (No. 5) [2009] EWHC 2549 (Admin).
193 R. Glover, Murphy on Evidence (14th ed., Oxford 2015), Ch. 13; C. Forsyth, ‘Public Interest
Immunity: Recent and Future Developments’ (1997) 56 Cambridge Law Journal 51; M. Supperstone, ‘A
New Approach to Public Interest Immunity?’ [1997] Public Law 211; I. Leigh, “Reforming Public Interest
Immunity”, [1995] 2 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues http://www.bailii.org/uk/other/journals/WebJ-
CLI/1995/issue2/leigh2.html ; I. Leigh and L. L Lustgarten, “Five Volumes in Search of Accountability:
The Scott Report”, (1996) 59 Modern Law Review 695–725; I. Leigh, ‘Public Interest Immunity’, (1997)
Parliamentary Affairs 55–70; J. Jacob, “From Privileged Crown to Interested Public” [1993] Public Law
121; A. Tomkins,’ Public Interest Immunity After Matrix Churchill’ [1993] Public Law 650.
194 Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910.
195 As happened following the ruling of the UK Supreme Court in Al-Rawi v The Security Service [2011]
UKSC 34; [2012] 1 AC 531 that the Security Service could not serve closed defences within a closed
material procedure.
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on intelligence material. The difficulties of devising a way in which it can do so
consistently with fair trial rights (notably Art. 6 of the ECHR) have led to the creation
of specialist court-substitute bodies which are not fully adversarial in the traditional
sense. Foremost among these are the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (discussed above)
and the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.
2. Special advocates
78So far as practical and evidential difficulties of handling secret material in court are
concerned, attitudes are now also more sceptical. The European Court of Human Rights
has insisted that the right to a fair trial (Art. 6 ECHR) requires courts to accommodate
some form of adversarial challenge to intelligence material even if normal trial
procedures, such as full cross-examination, cannot apply.196 This has led in recent years
to procedural innovations such as the introduction of the Special Immigration Appeals
Commission and, more widely, of Special Advocates who are security-cleared. These
innovations provide for the limited introduction of intelligence into legal proceedings in
a way consistent with fair trial rights: that is they allow some form of adversarial
challenge to intelligence material even if normal trial procedures, such as full cross-
examination, cannot apply.
79Prior to 1997, in immigration deportation cases, a decision to deport a person from
the United Kingdom on grounds of national security was taken by the Home Secretary
personally and there was no formal right of appeal. The Home Secretary’s decision was
reviewed by an Advisory Panel, which made recommendations on whether the Home
Secretary’s decision to should stand. The Panel’s recommendations were purely advisory
and although it was able to review the evidence relating to national security threat this
material was not disclosed to the applicant or his legal representatives on grounds of
national security. The decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Chahal v.
UK that a person facing deportation on grounds of national security had to be given an
effective means of challenging this before a judicial body197 led Parliament to create the
Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC). SIAC is an independent judicial
tribunal in which intelligence material can be presented with limited disclosure to the
deportee. The legislation provides for a Special Advocate to represent an appellant in
cases in which there is non-disclosable security evidence in relation to the immigration
decisions of the Home Secretary.198 Special Advocates have access to closed material and
represent the deportee’s interests but may not take instructions from the deportee.199
Since their introduction the use of Special Advocates has spread to a number of other
courts and tribunals in which decisions based on intelligence material can be challenged.
80Innovations like the Special Immigration Appeals Commission and Special Advocates
are often regarded by practising lawyers as regrettable incursions into the principle of
open justice.200 In particular, critics point to the professional and ethical difficulties for
196 See discussion of the special advocate system and the Special Immigration Appeals Commission
procedure in A and Others v UK Appl no. 3455/05, 19 February 2009 (G.C.), paras. 207–224 and drawing
an analogy between the requirements of Art. 6 and the procedural requirements of Art. 5(4) ECHR.
197 Chahal v UK (1997) 23 EHRR 413. The Court found that the then existing procedure violated Art. 5
(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights, because judicial review proceedings could not
effectively review the grounds for his detention, and because he was not represented before the Advisory
Panel.
198 Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, S. 6.
199 Special Immigration Appeals Commission Rules (as amended), Rules 36–38.
200 C. Forcese and L. Waldman Seeking Justice in an Unfair Process: Lessons from Canada, the United
Kingdom, and New Zealand on the Use of “Special Advocates” in National Security Proceedings, Ottawa
2007; Justice, Secret Evidence (London, 2009); M. Chamberlain, “Update on procedural fairness in closed
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lawyers arising from the duty to represent the interests of a person from whom
instructions cannot be taken and to whom material cannot be disclosed. Effectively
Special Advocates reviewing security material work in isolation and without normal
professional support. Subsequent decisions have produced minor changes to the
process- notably the requirement that to satisfy the European Convention on Human
Rights a person must be told the “gist” of the case against him- but in other respects the
system has been found to be a necessary limitation on the right of fair trial.201
3. Closed material procedures
81 Faced with a growing number of legal challenges implicating the agencies the
government sought to regain control and to establish a secure environment for litigation
concerning security intelligence, by introducing Closed Material Procedures (‘CMPs’) in
the Justice and Security Act 2013. The government argued that, on the one hand,
disclosure of intelligence material in open court would endanger national security and
intelligence cooperation but, on the other, to wholly exclude it would prevent judges
from taking important material into account and hamper the government in fully
defending itself against allegations (CMPs apply to civil cases only). The legislation is
intended to allow intelligence material to be considered under conditions of secrecy,
which may include consideration in the absence of the other party and their lawyers.
The court releases a summary of closed proceedings but, exceptionally, even the fact
that CMPs have been used may be withheld.
82 A number of safeguards are built into the legislation.202 Before agreeing to the use of
CMPs the court must be satisfied that that the alternative of an application for public
interest immunity has been considered, that there is relevant material which if disclosed
would damage national security and that a CMP would be in the interests of the fair and
effective administration of justice. The court will consider the material provided in
support of the application, to determine that it is relevant and that its disclosure would
damage national security. The court is under a duty to review the lifting of CMPs in the
light of developments throughout the proceedings.203 Special advocates can be ap-
pointed to participate and to challenge the relevance and admissibility of the intelligence
material.204 Moreover, there is an obligation to report to Parliament annually on the
operation of the CMP provisions205 and for an independent five-year review of the
legislation.206
83 CMPs are highly controversial as critics allege that they amount to a form of secret
justice.207 They argue that a civil claimant should not in effect have to bear the cost of
proceedings”. (2009) 28(4) Civil Justice Quarterly 448–543; J. Jackson, “The Role of Special Advocates:
Advocacy, Due Process and the Adversarial Tradition”, (2016) 20(4) International Journal of Evidence
and Proof 343–362.
201 ECtHR, Case of A. and Others v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 3455/05, Judgment (Grand
Chamber, 19 Feb. 2009), paras. 223 and 224, finding a violation of Article 5.4 because the applicants were
hindered in challenging the decision to deport by the generalised nature of allegations against them.
202 Justice and Security Act 2013, S. 6.
203 Justice and Security Act 2013, S. 7.
204 Justice and Security Act 2013, S. 9.
205 Justice and Security Act 2013, S. 12.
206 Justice and Security Act 2013, S. 13.
207 For critical discussion of the 2013 Act see: A.Peto and A.Tyrie, Neither Just Nor Secure (Centre for
Policy Studies, 2011) http://www.cps.org.uk/files/reports/original/130123103140-neitherjustnorsecure.pdf;
A.Tomkins, “Justice and security in the United Kingdom” (2014) Israel Law Review. ISSN 0021-2237
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/91090/1/91090.pdf; T. Hickman, ‘Turning out the lights: the Justice and Security
Act 2013’ http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/06/11/tom-hickman-turning-out-the-lights-the-justice-and-
security-act-2013/.
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protecting intelligence in the form of restrictions of his or her rights.208 Some argue that
it violates Article 6 ECHR,209 but domestic courts have so far not found any incompat-
ibility and the system has yet to be tested at Strasbourg.
4. Criminal trials and intelligence material
84Until the 1990s intelligence was mainly used as background by prosecution authorities
and it was unprecedented for intelligence officers to appear in court as witnesses. The
more prominent role that MI5 in particular has in relation to counter-terrorism has
brought about a significant change in that practice: it is now common for security officials
to give evidence (often, at the judge’s discretion, anonymously and from behind a screen
to protect their identity from becoming public). At the same time, practice has changed to
anticipate the disclosure of relevant intelligence material in criminal prosecutions.
85There are, nonetheless, a number of significant evidential restrictions, designed to
give protection to intelligence material. Foremost among these is the prohibition on the
use in legal proceedings of intercept material.210 The ban has been regularly reviewed
over the last three decades211 but successive governments have chosen to retain it for
operational reasons- it prevents any form of parallel challenge being mounted in
criminal proceedings to the decision to intercept. Maintenance of the ban, however,
puts the UK out of line with its international intelligence partners and now appears
somewhat anomalous in view of the much greater transparency surrounding surveil-
lance, following the introduction of the 2016 Act and the introduction of a judicial input
to authorisation through the ‘double lock’ provisions.
86Where the prosecution relies on other intelligence material, this has to be disclosed to
the defence- as noted above, Classified Material Procedures do not apply to criminal
trials. It is, however, possible (though rare in practice) for parts of a criminal trial to be
held in camera, with the public and press excluded.212 Moreover, where intelligence
material forms part of the background to a prosecution but is not relied upon in evidence,
the question arises of whether it should be disclosed to the defence. Prima facie, any
unused material that might reasonably be considered to assist the accused’s defence or to
undermine the prosecution case must be disclosed under the procedures contained in the
Criminal Procedure Investigations Act 1996.213 The Act provides however that material is
not subject to this duty where it would be against the public interest to disclose it214 and,
in such cases for the prosecution to apply to the court for a determination.
208 See Justice, Justice and Security Green Paper Consultation Response (London, 2012); Liberty,
Liberty’s Response to the Ministry of Justice’s Green Paper- Justice and Security (London, 2012); Human
Rights Joint Committee, 24th Report for 2011–12, The Justice and Security Green Paper, HL 286/HC 1777
(2011–12).
209 John Sullivan, “Closed Material Procedures and the Right to a Fair Trial” , 29 Maryland J. Int’l Law
269 (2014). Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol29/iss1/12.
210 The current provision is the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, S. 56.
211 See I. Leigh, ‘Intelligence and the Law in the United Kingdom’ in L. Johnson (ed.), Oxford
Handbook of National Security Intelligence, (Oxford University Press, 2010), 654–55.
212 For one example in which the Court of Appeal upheld the restrictions (which effectively prevented
any reporting of the circumstances surrounding the terrorism charges in question, of which the defendant
had been acquitted) see Guardian New and Media Ltd v.R and Erol Incedal [2016] EWCA Crim 11.
213 Criminal Procedure Investigations Act 1996, S. 3(1).
214 Criminal Procedure Investigations Act 1996, S. 3(6). Exceptionally, the prosecution may apply ex
parte to the court to determine if disclosure would be contrary to the public interest. The courts have
given guidance to protect the right of fair trial in such circumstances, including in some instances the
appointment of a special advocate to contest the prosecution’s application for withholding disclosure: R v.
H; R v. C [2004] UKHL 3.
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G. Conclusion
87 The environment in which the security and intelligence agencies operate has under-
gone rapid change in the past quarter century. This period has seen the agencies move
from their Cold War orientation to preoccupation with a diverse range of threats,
especially international terrorism, but also proliferation threats and organised crime. It
has also seen a remarkable growth in transparency. In the 1980s the agencies were still
shrouded in secrecy, so much so that one of them (MI6) was not even officially
acknowledged. Now, on the other hand, the system of accountability to the parliamen-
tary Intelligence and Security Committee is well-established, the services have a
relatively public profile (through their websites, and the heads give public lectures and
occasional media interviews) and they recruit staff openly, to the extent of championing
employment diversity.
88 So far as legal developments are concerned the change has been no less dramatic.
Since 9/11 the courts have become accustomed to hearing claims against the security
and intelligence agencies arising from the alleged abuses of the “War on Terror” and
have, to a small degree at least, relaxed their previously deferential attitude to national
security. The government, in turn, has accepted that intelligence cannot simply be a
“no-go zone” for legal accountability. Although protective measures like the Investiga-
tory Powers Tribunal, Special Advocates and Closed Material Procedures are contro-
versial for their incursion on the principles of open and adversarial justice, they do at
least allow independent courts and tribunals to examine the actions of the security and
intelligence agencies in a way that was unimaginable not so long ago.
89 Most dramatic of all perhaps has been the technological change over the period, with
many of the capabilities of the agencies laid bare since 2013 by the unprecedented
disclosures of Edward Snowden. The result was a (long overdue) public and parliamen-
tary debate about surveillance, resulting, with the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, in a
detailed and comprehensive legal framework that regulates and gives legitimacy to the
agencies’ capabilities. These changes have important implications for oversight of the
agencies also, bringing a discernible shift towards expert oversight through the new
office of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.
90 Technology also poses constant challenges, especially through the rapidly escalating
cyber threat, both from hostile states, such as North Korea and Russia, and non-state
actors. There has been a discernible attempt both to educate public opinion215 and to
legitimise the work of GCHQ especially in this field, through the establishment of a
public-facing National Cyber Security Centre.216
91 Looking ahead, the international environment for the agencies work will continue to
evolve, especially following Brexit in March 2019. Since 9/11 international intelligence
cooperation in the fight against terrorism has grown exponentially and although for the
UK agencies these arrangements are very far from exclusive to EU partners, those
relationships are nonetheless important, not least in sharing information about foreign
terrorist fighters and other violent Islamists. Significantly, early in 2018 the Chief of MI6
215 See especially the Prime Minister’s Mansion House speech in November 2017 to accusing Russia of
mounting ‘a sustained campaign of cyber espionage and disruption’ and of seeking to ‘weaponise
information’ by planting fake news stories and photo-shopped images ‘in an attempt to sow discord in
the West and undermine our institutions’: Rt. Hon. Theresa May, Mansion House Speech, 13 November
2017: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-to-the-lord-mayors-banquet-2017.
216 https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/.
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appeared alongside the heads of the DGSE and BND to affirm the importance of
continued cooperation after the UK leaves the EU217 and the Prime Minister spoke at
the same security conference of the aspiration for a new post-Brexit security treaty
between the EU and the UK.218
217 Joint statement 16th February 2018, ‘BND, DGSE and MI6 emphasise necessity of international
cooperation’ http://www.bnd.bund.de/EN/_Home/Startseite/Buehne_Box/Textbausteine/News_ENG/
180216_MSC18/180216_MSC18_Artikel.html;jsessionid=09F8AA7423E566CB6008DD5085713E84.1_
cid386?nn=3132246.
218 ‘Theresa May: “Europe’s Security is our Security’, BBC News 17 February 2018. http://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/av/uk-politics-43096450/theresa-may-europe-s-security-is-our-security.
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